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Re: executable content
Wyllys Ingersoll (wyllys
reston.ans.net)
Tue, 23 Sep 1997 21:47:37 -0400
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The majority of customers I have encountered are concerned
with performance above all else and scanning for the embedded
script languages introduce noticable latency for an HTTP proxy.
Detecting Java bytecode is relatively painless, but searching for
the different scripts is non-trivial. ActiveX is especially
difficult as it can be inserted in many different ways. Just
looking for <OBJECT> or <SCRIPT=...> tags is not going to catch
100% of the code.
A really thorough content scanner might be best placed on
a 2nd proxy machine just inside the firewall to reduce the
load on the firewall itself, especially if the firewall is
handling a heavy load of mail in addition to heavy web traffic.
BTW - the ANS InterLock now has the capability to screen for Java,
Javascript, and ActiveX. However all content scanning is
turned OFF by default.
-- Wyllys Ingersoll ANS CommunicationsOn Tue, Sep 23, 1997 at 07:30:20PM -0500, dnewman
McGraw-Hill.com wrote: > > > mjr wrote: > > >> E) Expecting a decent portion of firewall administrators to be like those I > >> mentioned above, how restrictive are most commercial firewall products > >> out-of-the-box? (i.e., Is my feeling that 3) should be blocked by default > >> the reality?) > > >I'd guess that most commercial firewalls, out of the box, > >won't block Java/ActiveX unless you tell them to. That may > >be a wrong guess, though. > > At the time of the Data Comm test (January/February '97) only three out of 20 > firewalls had built-in screening for Java *and* ActiveX: Global Internet (now > Cisco), Seattle Software Labs (now Watchguard), and TIS. > > Eight could screen Java: Altavista (DEC), ANS, Check Point, GI, Raptor, Seattle, > Secure Sidewinder, and TIS. > > Dunno if that's changed since. Check Point has a bunch more partners, including > Finjan, so they may have a plug-in for ActiveX. Seems kinda scary that at least > 12 firewalls have no capability for screening executable content. . . > > dn > > >
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