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RE: a long response to a Short note on new Laws
Stout, Bill (StoutB
pios.com)
Tue, 07 Jul 1998 14:32:04 -0400
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The basic issue I have with these new laws is the general direction
(think about the attrition technique used against smoking, from
international flights to resturaunts to public streets).
1. CALEA (Carrier Wiretapping law) which is effective y2000.
http://www.fbi.gov/calea/calea1.htm. - Allows government to covertly
monitor public traffic. Establishes a global precident (see:
http://jya.com/stoa-atpc.htm#4 ). (jya.com=cool site)
2. GAK/Encryption control (Limits encryption strength) still lives,
though defeated in many forms (Clipper, Key Escrow). - Prevents strong
encryption of conversations.
3. Digital Millennium Act (Copywright law effectively outlawing
security testing) passed senate 1998. - Weakens overall security by
obscurity, stops public 'beta testing' of security mechanisms. Eases
the ability to insert covert or mandated government security backdoors.
Search for 'Digital Millennium Act' at http://thomas.loc.gov/ , click on
[S.2037.ES].
In other words, government wants to monitor your conversations (or
thoughts and ideas), prevent you from encrypting them, and prevents you
from really securing your computer. The public whitestory/coverstory
for the overall effort is 'law enforcement', however the underlying
strategic effort is for 'politicial control', and pits government
against people rather than 'of and for the people'. Note that
governments think in strategic terms, individuals react tactical: Easy
win for government.
If attrition is a known and well-established precident for establishing
control, then such surveillance or security backdoors can easily be
mandated for corporate networks perceived as being part of the nations'
'critical infrastructure'
(http://www.fbi.gov/programs/iptf/glossary.htm), university networks
which harbor many foreign exchange students, social programs which will
network the poor or disabled (who have little political protest power),
and commercial security products (most easily those from
authoritarian/socialist countries).
Related: http://www.cato.org/testimony/ct5-24-5.html
Bill Stout
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