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NFR Wizards Archive: Re: Penetration testing via shrinkware

Re: Penetration testing via shrinkware

Ted Doty (tediss.net)
Mon, 21 Sep 1998 09:33:43 -0400

At 11:19 PM 9/19/98 -0400, Paul D. Robertson wrote:

> While it isn't 100% foolproof, there's
>a lot to be learned from a B2 evaluation. Security modeling, code
>walk-throughs, secure development methodologies, they all have their
>place if you're going to build assurance. "After-the-fact" testing is
>always _much_ more blind than during "construction" testing. Just as
>crystal boxes tend to be better than black boxes in that regard.

ObDisclaimer: I survived two B1/2 evaluations (actually one Orange Book and
one ITSec), and I build a scanner.

The biggest problem in the evaluations was the quality of the evaluation
teams. Teams with high caliber members, which operate together as a stable
team for extended periods might be effective. What I saw was that you
could count on neither.

The upshot is that Orange Book methods can probably only be applied for
products which place a premium on reliability - for example, medical
applications. These systems will always be more expensive if developed
under TCSec guidelines, and they will be upgraded with new features more
slowly. This argues pretty strongly for less formal methods, such as peer
review, for most products.

I have never seen any data that suggest that formally-evaluated systems are
(much, if any) higher quality than non-evaluated systems. If you make the
assumption that each of the Orange Book implementations of {security
modeling, code walk-throughs, secure development methodologies) will only
catch a portion of the defects, the industry may be better served by a less
formal/structured analysis combined with black box analysis. By "better
served" I mean less expensive, easier to use products that provide roughly
equivalent levels of protection.

Then again, maybe not. However, I won't be taking my scanner anywhere near
Orange Book until this is a *lot* more clear. Your mileage, as always, may
vary.

- Ted

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