OSEC

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Re: B1/2 and untrustworthy admins
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Re: B1/2 and untrustworthy admins

  • To: NTBUGTRAQLISTSERV.NTBUGTRAQ.COM
  • Subject: Re: B1/2 and untrustworthy admins
  • From: Steve Birnbaum <sbirnSECURITY.ORG.IL>
  • Date: Sat, 28 Mar 1998 15:17:19 +0300
  • Comments: To: Paul Leach <paullemicrosoft.com>
  • In-Reply-To: Your message of "Fri, 27 Mar 1998 18:03:17 -0800." <5CEA8663F24DD111A96100805FFE6587031E3CAFred-msg-51.dns.microsoft.com>
  • Reply-To: Steve Birnbaum <sbirnSECURITY.ORG.IL>
  • Sender: Windows NT BugTraq Mailing List <NTBUGTRAQLISTSERV.NTBUGTRAQ.COM>
> Wow. :-)

Yeah, better check for a solar event last night.

> Just wondering, but how would B1 or B2 help in the case under discussion?

My understanding is that the admin has no direct access to the
managing processes, but must go through the security subsystem.
Given that, the admin can probably modify system binaries but I see
no reason for OS to need the ability to give the admin write access
to the audit logs.  If the admin can't modify the audit logs, then even
if the security subsystem gave them access to modify binaries, there
would still be a trail.

Still, even given all that I wouldn't log into my own box from an
untrusted system, no matter what anyone told me.


  Steve

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