OSEC

Neohapsis is currently accepting applications for employment. For more information, please visit our website www.neohapsis.com or email hr@neohapsis.com
 
http-equiv_at_excite.com
Date: Sat Jul 27 2002 - 14:03:53 CDT

  • Messages sorted by: [ date ] [ thread ] [ subject ] [ author ]

    Saturday, July 27, 2002

    Trivial lead-up to yet another silent delivery and installation of an
    executable on the target computer using Outlook Express 6. This can
    be achieved combining several past possibilities, specifically the
    following:

    http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/1033
    http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/2456

    and here:

    http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/4387

    And:

    XML. In order to achieve the required results as outlined in the
    above, we must determine the location of the Temporary Internet File
    [TIF] folders. This can only be achieved if we can physically open
    up our file from within and read its location. Technically that can
    only be achieved if we have a security dialogue prompt asking us for
    permission. For security reasons all embedded and attached files are
    transferred to the TIF upon opening the mail message. If we elect to
    open the file through acceptance of the security warning dialogue, it
    is opened from within the TIF by whatever program is associated with
    that file.

    Okay:

    Okay. XML. XML files are associated with Internet Explorer. It
    utilises an XML parser to parse the file for display in Internet
    Explorer. These files are peculiar little files that require an
    additional file called a style sheet [*.xsl] in order to process
    scripting and html. To do that, the file must be 'linked' to the XML
    file like so:

     <?xml version="1.0"?>
    <?xml-stylesheet type="text/xsl" href="malware.xsl" ?>

    where malware.xsl can contain our scripting and html.

    And:

    Well, for security purposes linking to a remote *.xsl fle is
    denied: "permission denied", so instead we force our scripting and
    html into the XML file and into the XML parser directly:

    <?xml version="1.0" ?>
    <?xml-stylesheet type="text/css"
    href="http://www.malware.com/malware.css" ?>
    <malware>

    <h4 style="position: absolute;top:39;left:expression(alert
    (document.location));font-family:arial;font-size:12pt;BACKGROUND-
    IMAGE:url('http://www.malware.com/youlickit.gif');background-
    repeat:no-repeat;background-position: 100 30;z-index:-
    100;height:200pt;width:400pt;font-family:Verdana;color:red">sure it
    can, malware says so</h4>
    </malware>

    What this does is generate an error in the XML parser along with our
    html and scripting, and as a consequence, having the file opened up
    from within the TIF by Internet Explorer, we are once again able to
    determine our TIF location. Couple that with the aforementioned past
    possibilities and we are once again in business.

    Working Example:

    [nothing but text]

    http://www.malware.com/cannotindeed.zip

    [screen shot: http://www.malware.com/x-ma.png 17KB]

    Important Notes:

    1.On several test machines, recollection is foggy as to default
    status of *.xml in mail. Possibility is that 'confirm open after
    download' is not default.
    2. On several test occasions, scripting was fired in mail and
    remotely on the web site despite 'active scripting off' both, however
    not reproducible consistentantly and may be related to processor
    speed and xml parser delay in parsing combination.
    3. Test series of win98 machines, Internet Explorer 6.0.2600 and
    Outlook Express 6.0.2600 bandages and all
    4. None.

    End Call

    --
    http://www.malware.com