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From: Rouland, Chris (ISSAtlanta) (CRouland_at_ISS.NET)
Date: Sun Jan 26 2003 - 20:46:27 CST

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    X-Force (Jon Larimer) did some analysis on Ali and IERK8243.SYS on a
    sample provided to us by AVERT. It give a remote attacker a shell on
    the infected machine. Here is some information from Jon about how the
    driver works:

    IERK8243.SYS:
    -------------

    This is a driver that enables stealth functionality on the system. When
    this driver is installed and running, any application that knows how to
    interface with it can hide files,
    registry keys, and processes from any user application.

    Creates a device called "\DosDevices\mp437bba8e". That device name is
    used to access the
    driver. Applications will access the driver to hide themselves.

    The driver hooks into the service descriptor table to replace the
    following functions:
    NtOpenKey()
    NtCreateKey()
    NtEnumerateKey()
    NtCreateFile()
    NtOpenFile()
    NtDeviceIoControlFile()
    NtQueryDirectoryFile()
    NtOpenProcess()
    NtQuerySystemInformation()

    The driver checks those requests and makes sure nobody is looking for
    something in the
    "stealth list". For certain functions it also checks the data returned
    from those
    functions to clean out any references to keys/files/processes in the
    stealth list.

    An application makes an IOCTL call to this driver and the driver will
    add it's information to the stealth list, so it won't show up in the
    registry, HD, or in memory.

    It also uses PsSetCreateProcessNotifyRoutine() so the driver will be
    alerted any time a
    process is created.

    "slanretnisys" - This string shows up in the driver binary but is not
    used... it's
    SysInternals backwards. The code was probably taken from SysInternals
    code.
    RegMon/FileMon/etc use the same method of hooking system calls.

    --------------------------------------------------------------
    Chris Rouland
    Director / X-Force
    Internet Security Systems, Inc.
    http://xforce.iss.net
    croulandiss.net
     

    -----Original Message-----
    From: Barron Mertens [mailto:bmertensUWO.CA]
    Sent: Sunday, January 26, 2003 5:30 PM
    To: NTBUGTRAQLISTSERV.NTBUGTRAQ.COM
    Subject: Rogue Kernel Driver ierk8243.sys may be novel Trojan

    Approximately around Jan 10 2003 our main database cluster began
    experiencing random unexplained "blue screen of death" crashes. The blue
    screen claimed that the component that had failed was called
    ierk8243.sys and this was the cause on both machines (Win2Ksp3 and
    SQL2000sp2). Inspection of those machines and even google returned no
    matches for that file or anything close (other than someone's email
    address in Iceland I think). I bit the bullet (credit card?) and called
    in Microsoft Premium Support Services after I ran out of ideas and had
    suffered through too many crashes. After a week of analyzing dump files
    we had a breakthrough when someone else showed up with the same problem,
    that person discovered that if you reboot into safe mode and search the
    registry that there is a kernel level (like a hardware device driver)
    driver called ierk8243.sys installed and you can also then find the file
    on the hard drive in the %systemroot%\system32\drivers folder. While the
    driver is running you cannot find it in the registry or on the file
    system or on a list of running processes, booting into safe mode
    prevents the driver from loading. The file's properties read as a
    standard MS file belonging to the original OS install, including the
    timestamp info. To kill the driver just change the startup value to 4
    (disabled) in the registry and rename the file. MS and NAI and
    TrendMicro are analyzing the file to see what it was doing and hopefully
    they can figure out how it got in. The only info to come out of the
    analysis so far is it might have been using port 961 and this MAY be a
    Trojan horse related to "Backdoor/Alley" which is quite obscure. We have
    found this code on four machines altogether, all administered by myself
    and all running SQL Server (not sure who is guilty), two machines were
    Win2k Advanced Server and two were XP Pro.

    Barron Mertens
    Senior System Engineer/Developer
    Faculty of Education
    The University of Western Ontario
    London, Ontario, Canada
    N6G 1G7
    Room 1095
    519-661-2111 x88662
    bmertensuwo.ca

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