|
Neohapsis is currently accepting applications for employment. For more information, please visit our website www.neohapsis.com or email hr@neohapsis.com |
From: Daniel Grunblatt (daniel
grunblatt.com.ar)Date: Thu Feb 01 2001 - 14:19:41 CST
On Thu, 1 Feb 2001, James Ponder wrote:
> On Thu, Feb 01, 2001 at 12:17:38PM +0000, Charlie Root wrote:
> > That's my professional advice, if your system is trojaned or backdoored,
> > it's too late to worry about root safety, it's already gone.
>
> Thanks for your email, it was interesting reading, it was appreciated.
>
> However, tell me... Say there was an exploitable vulnerability that gave
> the attacker root access on your OpenBSD machine - perhaps the recent ftpd
> bug or something like the recent bind problem. The attacker now has root
> access and replaces your /usr/bin/su and/or /usr/bin/sudo with their own
> version that records your password. They disable your checksum integrity
> checker, perhaps by simply altering it to return the old checksum, or
> something more complicated like a kernel attack.
>
> There might be something else you've installed that would alert you,
> perhaps remote syslog logging or something, but let's say you don't have
> that kind of setup (and lets face it, most companies don't, and even if
> they did, the log doesn't get read).
>
> Let's assume the attacker does not launch network-level attacks or that
> your network is all secure from arp attacks or whatever.
>
> The attacker cannot do much. Obviously they can alter all the services
> on the machine, but that's as far as it goes, your other machines are safe.
>
> Now, you want to do some maintenance one day:
>
> * If you connect to this machine via ssh and run '/usr/bin/su' you lose your
> root password to the attacker.
>
> * If you connect to this machine via ssh and run sudo, you lose your user
> account password to the attacker.
>
> * If you had logged in as root via ssh, you wouldn't have lost any access
> details.
wrong, you lose your root password to the attacker.
>
> As pointed out to me, there are mechanisms such as s/key that could be used,
> but that is a real effort to most people. Plus, you could have many
> different root passwords, but again, that is a real effort to most people
> too.
>
> So, in this situation, wouldn't ssh to root be better?
no
>
>
> Best wishes, James
> --
> James Ponder; www.squish.net
>
- Messages sorted by: [ date ] [ thread ] [ subject ] [ author ]