OSEC

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Re: New tcp stack attack

From: Duncan Patton a Campbell (campbellneotext.ca)
Date: Wed Oct 01 2008 - 09:22:16 CDT


On Wed, 1 Oct 2008 15:58:22 +0200
Claudio Jeker <cjekerdiehard.n-r-g.com> wrote:

> On Wed, Oct 01, 2008 at 03:31:00PM +0200, Stephan A. Rickauer wrote:
> > On Wed, 2008-10-01 at 14:52 +0200, Leon Dippenaar wrote:
> > > Hi there,
> > >
> > > is there any weight to this new story on slashdot
> > > http://it.slashdot.org/it/08/10/01/0127245.shtml
> > >
> > > about a new attacker possible to break any tcp stack? Sounds rather
> > > shady, so here I am, perhaps you guys have your ears closer to the ground
> >
> > A little bit less vage info can be found here
> >
> > http://tinyurl.com/3hv3kf
> >
>
> This article is mostly about exploiting SYN cookies to bring servers into
> resource starvation. OpenBSD does not implement SYN cookies. We have a SYN
> cache with a upper limit of open handshakes. Together with random initial
> sequence numbers it is hard to finish the 3-way handshake without getting
> the SYN/ACK from the server on OpenBSD systems.
>

It seems to me the "problem" is with SYN cookies.

Dhu

> I'm not too concerned about this "fundamental problem with TCP" but as
> usual the mentioned article is less informative then the back side of my
> breakfast cereals box.
> --
> :wq Claudio