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From: Enos D'Andrea (temp4282138782edlabs.it)
Date: Wed Jan 14 2015 - 07:32:07 CST
On 14/01/2015 12:24, Stefan Sperling wrote:
> Bootstrapping trust is always going to be hard no matter what we do
> and how hard we try. [...] Now the answer has become "buy a CD
> and cross-check it with signify" and it's still not enough. [...]
"Buying a CD" in my case includes a 5.000 mile trip through multiple
"five-eyes" nations, whose overzealous three letter agencies officially
intercept physical shipments to install backdoors and hardware implants.
"Cross-checking" of OpenBSD commercial CD sets at present can only be
partial, as no official full checksums seem to be provided. Even
cross-checking *all* files referenced by the ISO filesystem would still
allow a malicious boot sector to directly reference unallocated space.
Let's call a spade a spade: the worst-case scenario is an APT
intercepting the shipment of a commercial CD set, substitute one or more
CDs and repackage it. Extremely unlikely for the average person,
not-so-much for IT security consultants with important clients.