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From: RISKS List Owner (riskocsl.sri.com)
Date: Wed Apr 11 2001 - 20:34:51 CDT

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    RISKS-LIST: Risks-Forum Digest Wednesday 11 April 2001 Volume 21 : Issue 34

       ACM Committee on Computers and Public Policy, Peter G. Neumann, moderator

    ***** See last item for further information, disclaimers, caveats, etc. *****
    This issue is archived at <URL:http://catless.ncl.ac.uk/Risks/21.34.html>
    and by anonymous ftp at ftp.sri.com, cd risks .

    MIT'S cathedral of learning: online and free (NewsScan)
    Modern Times, II (jhaynes)
    Careful with that e-mail! (Lord Wodehouse)
    Risks of appearing in rec.humor.funny (Jim Griffith)
    Re: Risks of auto-updating software (L. P. Levine)
    More on Yahoo mail's anti-virus attachment translation (Kirrily Skud Robert)
    Re: Bogus Microsoft Corporation digital certificates (Nick Brown)
    Summertime blues (Lord Wodehouse)
    Re: Upcoming time-change risks (Derek Ziglar)
    Another Silly Date Problem (Peter B. Ladkin)
    Re: Dutch police fight cell theft ... (Zygo Blaxell, Christian Bartsch)
    Re: Cellphone text 'bombs' (Peter Chuck)
    Re: Future Mac Viruses? (Craig S. Cottingham, Paul Hessels)
    Re: "Internet Voting is no 'Magic Ballot'" (Julian White, Jay R. Ashworth)
    Bathtub Burnout (Rebecca Mercuri)
    Auto-updating and ReplayTV (Alan Wexelblat)
    Abridged info on RISKS (comp.risks)


    Date: Wed, 04 Apr 2001 09:05:05 -0700
    From: "NewsScan" <newsscannewsscan.com>
    Subject: MIT'S cathedral of learning: online and free

    The Massachusetts Institute of Technology has committed up to $100 million
    for a 10-year project to create public Web sites that offer, without charge,
    learning materials used in almost all of its 2,000 courses. The materials
    will include lecture notes, problem sets, syllabuses, exams, simulations,
    and video lectures. Called OpenCourseWare, the program is not intended for
    "audit" purposes and not as a means for students to earn college
    credits. Computer science professor Hal Abelson explained: "In the Middle
    Ages people built cathedrals, where the whole town would get together and
    make a thing that's greater than any individual person could do and the
    society would kind of revel in that. We don't do that as much anymore, but
    in a sense this is kind of like building a cathedral." MIT President Charles
    M. Vest is confident that the new program will in no way detract from the
    value received by residential students who are paying tuition of $26,000 for
    the on-campus experience of working directly with faculty and other
    students." I don't think we are giving away the direct value, by any means,
    that we give to students. But I think we will help other institutions around
    the world... I also suspect in this country and throughout the world, a lot
    of really bright, precocious high school students will find this a great
    playground." (*The New York Times*, 4 Apr 2001; NewsScan Daily, 4 Apr 2001

      [This is a marvelous development to inVest in the future.
      RISKS applauds MIT. Three Cheers! PGN]


    Date: Sun, 8 Apr 2001 10:13:24 -0500 (CDT)
    From: <jhaynesalumni.uark.edu>
    Subject: Modern Times, II

    The local paper reprinted a column by *Los Angeles Times* columnist Doris
    Kearns Goodwin. She starts out saying that Abe Lincoln's 1861 first
    inaugural address reached Sacramento in a time of seven days and 17 hours by
    Pony Express. "On March 17, [2001] the London Times released a Web version
    of a story that would appear in the next day's paper, falsely alleging that
    Steven Spielberg -- who has optioned my unfinished manuscript on Lincoln --
    and I planned to present Lincoln as a 'manic depressive racist' and head of a
    'dysfunctional' family 'who nearly lost the American Civil War.'"

    "Carried by satellite, the story reached Matt Drudge's Florida headquarters
    and was placed on his Web site even before the newsprint edition of the
    London Times had reached the streets. In the next 24 hours, 1.6 million
    hits were recorded n the Drudge site. The story was picked up by dozens of
    newspapers and made it to Rush Limbaugh's Web site, where Spielberg and I
    were accused of engaging in a left-wing conspiracy to denigrate American
    heroes in order to enhance the reputation of Bill Clinton. Within hours,
    the story was being discussed on talk radio and on television, and I was
    receiving e-mails from lincoln scholars as far away as Australia, who were
    understandably concerned by the story's portrayal of my intentions."

    Goes on to say that no reporter ever contacted her to check the accuracy of
    the story, and that the original reporter blamed the error on others and
    would allow her to submit a letter to the editor; but by then the false
    story was all over the world. Goes on to detail some history of Lincoln,
    some very early statements of his that could be construed to make him appear
    racist, clearly voided by his later statements, including his last speech,
    which stirred up John Wilkes Booth to kill him.


    Date: Fri, 6 Apr 2001 17:54:05 +0100 (GMT Daylight Time)
    From: Lord Wodehouse <w0400ggr.co.uk>
    Subject: Careful with that e-mail!

    Reported by the BBC


      A chief executive who used an e-mail to threaten his staff with the sack
      for being lazy has seen his company's share price collapse after the
      message appeared on the Internet.

      Neal Patterson, head of the Cerner Corporation in Kansas City, USA, had
      no idea his private directive to staff would end up being seen by
      millions of people on the world wide web.

      In the three days after the publication of the message, shares in the
      healthcare software development company plummeted 22% on the stock

    It never ceases to amaze me that people armed with a computer and e-mail
    completely lose their common sense. However it seems to the the type of
    e-mail that should never have been written let alone sent and not by a
    senior person in the company. Gerald Ratner built up the family business,
    piling it high, selling it cheap and making a fortune out of cut-price
    jewelry. But a throw-away joke in a speech at the Royal Albert Hall in
    front of Chancellor Norman Lamont brought his empire crashing down around
    his ears. (he called a item he sold cr*p.) With the Internet the inept
    director can find that it is even easier to ensure that bad news travels
    faster and further.


    Date: Thu, 5 Apr 2001 15:34:57 -0500 (CDT)
    From: griffitholagrande.net
    Subject: Risks of appearing in rec.humor.funny

    In 1994, I had an article appear on rec.humor.funny titled "AOL's cutting
    edge customer service", in which I related an incident where an AOL
    representative responded to a complaint by suggesting that the complainant
    should "telephone the Internet and talk to their tech support people".
    Since them (and as recently as today), I've been receiving email from AOL
    users who are somehow convinced that my e-mail address is the AOL customer
    service address.



    Date: Tue, 3 Apr 2001 12:49:31 -0500 (CDT)
    From: "Prof. L. P. Levine" <levineblatz.cs.uwm.edu>
    Subject: Re: Risks of auto-updating software

    Graystreak <wexmedia.mit.edu> said:
    >In his recent (April 2001) AskTog column, Bruce Tognazzini reports on his
    >ReplayTV which, one recent day, updated itself to disable a valuable
    > http://www.asktog.com/columns/045ReplayTV.html

    I agree with his main point that software that updates itself is a menace
    and a problem, but the replay change that was noted in the Tognazzini
    posting came and went in about 4 weeks. I noted the change and did not like
    it but said nothing. After a few weeks the feature that had been disabled
    (a clean pause without ads) reappeared. I must assume that there was a good
    deal of noise made by the customer base as RePlay had just scrapped a
    revenue source. Good for them.

    Customers who don't like a product revision should speak up and even decide
    to drop the product. Manufacturers will listen, but we got to talk.

    Leonard P. Levine e-mail levineuwm.edu
    Professor, Computer Science University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee


    Date: Mon, 2 Apr 2001 22:00:13 -0400
    From: Kirrily Skud Robert <skudinfotrope.net>
    Subject: More on Yahoo mail's anti-virus attachment translation

    Further to "Yahoo! Mail translates attachments" in RISKS-21.27, I saw
    the following e-mail on a mailing list which discusses medieval cookery:

      From: <xxxxxxxxxxyahoo.com>
      Subject: (OT) "Medireview" ???
      Does anyone know why certain Web sites and mail servers change the word
      "medieval" to "medireview" without any warning? Have I missed something?
      Did they change the spelling of the word, and not mail me the notice?

    In addition to translating terms like "expression" to "statement" and "eval"
    to "review" in an attempt to disable potential virus code, it seems that
    they don't check for word boundaries, so "eval" is translated to "review"
    even when it's within a word like "medieval".

    It's easy to fix this in Perl (for instance), where the programmer
    would write


    to check for word boundaries.

    The RISKS? Firstly, "two wrongs don't make a right." Yahoo's half-baked
    attempt to fix one problem without adequate thought or testing has caused
    more problems. Secondly, while the mangling of the word "medieval" on a
    cookery mailing list may be unimportant, similar mangling occurring to a
    person's name, address, e-mail address, URL or other important data could
    have knock-on effects of a much more serious nature.

      Addendum: I've just had a report of an actual instance of a mangled
      e-mail address:

    > Someone [...] changed his e-mail address to "cheval" and several of us
    > couldn't get his new address straight because it kept coming up at
    > "chreview". Eventually, we realized what the word actually was, but it
    > took a while.


    Kirrily "Skud" Robert http://infotrope.net


    Date: Fri, 6 Apr 2001 17:55:18 +0200
    From: BROWN Nick <Nick.BROWNcoe.int>
    Subject: Re: Bogus Microsoft Corporation digital certificates (Savit, R-21.30)

    This whole area is reminiscent of, say, nuclear power, or electronic voting,
    or anything based on Social Security numbers: the technocrats (who do not
    necessarily have any technical background, even if thet are in the private
    sector) come up with some great scheme that "simply" relies on nobody ever,
    ever screwing up. (Since most technocrats have never actually done a real
    job in their lives, they have probably never screwed up either.) This
    attitude is known in French as "yapuka", short for "il n'y a plus qu'a...",
    or "it's easy, all you have to do is...".

    It "should have been obvious" (that phrase again) that at some point,
    somebody would screw up and some invalid certificates would slip out. If
    this had been considered in advance, Microsoft and Verisign would maybe look
    a bit less like headless chickens right now.

    I have a modest proposal: all documentation and marketing material
    concerning any system which contains any technology whatsoever should, by
    law, carry the word "probably" in front of each verb describing technical
    details of the system, and "unless someone screws up" at the end of each
    sentence describing (claimed) functionality.

    - "When you click on the icon of the diskette, Microsoft Word will
    *probably* save your work".
    - "When you select 'Book now', the system will *probably* reserve your
    - "XYZ Backup Manager means you will never lose another file, unless someone
    screws up".

    See how much more accurate this is? Imagine how much happier the world will
    be without all the disappointment which users feel when the system fails to
    deliver as promised.

    Nick Brown, Strasbourg, France


    Date: Tue, 3 Apr 2001 13:18:28 +0100
    From: Lord Wodehouse <w0400ggr.co.uk>
    Subject: Summertime blues

    It may have already been noted, but in Germany, Deutsche Telekom had
    problems with their speaking clock over the weekend of 24th/25th
    March. Users using the alarm service found that on Monday 26th March their
    call was an hour late, because the system did not advance to daylight
    savings time.

    I expect there were other problems, including the ones where US and
    UK/Europe companies found that the time difference was one hour more for a

    John, Global Research IS, GlaxoSmithKline, Medicines Research Centre,
    Gunnels Wood Road, Stevenage SG1 2NY United Kingdom
    +44 1438 76 3222 e-mail: mailto:w0400ggr.co.uk Web: http://www.gsk.com/


    Date: Tue, 3 Apr 2001 21:08:13 -0400
    From: "Derek Ziglar" <dziglaryahoo.com>
    Subject: Re: Upcoming time-change risks

    > In the USA we change to Daylight Savings Time (spring ahead) ...
    > This year, that also happens to be the first day in April. ...
    > I can see that this confluence is going to cause some amount of confusion,
    > as some people automatically disbelieve any official-seeming announcement

    More true that you may think. I may even cause the media to fail to even
    report such announcements.

    In January 1999, a defect in the Microsoft Visual C++ Runtime Libraries was
    discovered and documented in PC World magazine. Someone had discovered that
    the time function in the runtime library had an inherent error that it would
    misapply the Daylight Saving Time setting of Microsoft Windows anytime the
    daylight savings time went into effect on the first day of the month--like
    in 2001. The consequence of this bug is that Visual C++ built programs and
    others that use this same shared library will 'see' the time incorrectly for
    the first week of the month, then correct itself. Programs on the same
    computer that don't use this library should see the time correctly.

    The risk? Well, I certainly heard no recent alerts that this was to occur! I
    had no cause to suspect any problem until Sunday morning when my company's
    servers started misprocessing work because the C++ programs that process our
    data 'saw' the time one hour differently than SQL Server itself did. A most
    perplexing situation to debug--when two programs running on the *same*
    computer have a different view of the time!

    Sure, Microsoft reports this bug was supposedly fixed in a service patch to
    the *compiler*, But who was responsible for distributing the fixed *runtime*
    components that were distributed with all the applications people had
    written using that compiler?

    As Alan Wexelblat said, how many people would fail to take seriously a
    problem warning associated with April 1st? Apparently enough that the media
    completely failed to follow up on this April 1, 2001 risk they had reported
    over two years ago!

    January 1999 article from PC World

    Microsoft Knowledge Base documentation on the problem.

    Derek Ziglar, Atlanta, Georgia


    Date: Fri, 06 Apr 2001 09:15:20 +0200
    From: "Peter B. Ladkin" <ladkinrvs.uni-bielefeld.de>
    Subject: Another Silly Date Problem

    I have a digital certificate from a well-known german certification
    authority, trustcenter.de. They informed me on the 9 February that the
    certificate was about to run out.

        Es laeuft am 04/05/01 15:00:42.000 ab.

    (It runs out on 04/05/01)

    On the 4 April, they said it again:

        Ihr [...] Client-Zertifikat mit den folgenden Daten, [...]
        gueltig seit: 04/05/00 15:00:42.000, [...]
        nur noch bis zum 04/05/01 15:00:42.000 gueltig ist.

    (Your certificate with the following Information [...]
     valid since 04/05/00 15:00:42.000
     ist only valid until 04/05/01 15:00:42.000)

    I believed them. I also want this certificate. But this morning at
    06.25 local time they informed me:

        Ihr Class 1 Client-Zertifikat mit den folgenden Daten, [...]
        ist am 04/05/01 15:00:42.000 abgelaufen.

    (Your certificate with the following Information [...]
     ran out on 04/05/01 15:00:42.000)

    In the language in which this security agency is writing to me, 04/05/01
    means unambiguously 4 May 2001. As it does unambiguously all over Europe.
    But they obviously meant it to mean the 5 Apr 2001. Can I *really* be the
    first person that has been caught by this mistake?

    This goes to show that it's not only NASA that can mix up their units. The
    solution is probably to insist that agencies which provide an official
    security function use ISO-standard dates.

    Peter Ladkin


    Date: Wed, 04 Apr 2001 16:59:54 -0400
    From: Zygo Blaxell <zblaxellfeedme.hungrycats.org>
    Subject: Re: Dutch police fight cell theft ... (Dzubin, RISKS-21.32)

    >After a user reports his GMS handset stolen, [...]

    Uhhh...I'm not sure what GMS is in this context, but if it's a misspelling
    of "GSM", then I see a problem.

    In GSM, there is a separate SIM card in the handset which contains all of
    the subscriber's authentication/authorization information, and which is
    intentionally interchangeable between handsets (subject to some restrictions,
    but generally when switching between handsets supplied by the same
    service provider).

    If someone was trying to sell the _handset_, they could do so without
    including the SIM card--I've done this a couple of times as handset
    technology evolves over the years. The buyer provides their own smart
    card, and the telco doesn't even have to be informed that the sale took
    place for the handset to work for its new owner.

    Naive GSM users reading this article might attempt to send such messages
    to their own phone number if their handset is stolen. This won't work
    if the thief has any clue at all. Kids, don't try this at home.

    I suppose it is possible that the police may use the telco's resources to
    track the handset down by its IMEI or something--handsets, high-end
    accessories, even batteries these days have serial numbers embedded into
    them which are accessible from the handset firmware and can be
    interrogated from the telco (if not routinely broadcast while the
    handset is on).

    Zygo Blaxell (Laptop) <zblaxellfeedme.hungrycats.org>


    Date: 03 Apr 2001 00:00:00 +0000
    From: cbartschgmx.de (Christian Bartsch)
    Subject: SMS in Netherlands on stolen phones (Re: RISKS-21.32)

    I've only seen reports (but no firsthand source, maybe because of my lack
    of the Dutch language), but I have a little difficulty believing them.

    AFAIK the SMS service in the GSM network addresses the SIM card in the phone
    (i.e. the mobile's number). If you insert another (not stolen) SIM card and
    throw away the old one, you won't receive any text messages. Why? That
    would require addressing the IMEI of the stolen phone, which to my knowledge
    is not possible. I think some American phones have their number hardcoded
    in the phone, but here (i.e. GSM in Europe) you could only annoy anyone
    using a stolen SIM card, not a stolen phone with a "clean" SIM card in,




    Date: Tue, 3 Apr 2001 11:26:24 +0200
    From: Peter Chuck <PChuckcapgemini.nl>
    Subject: Re: Cellphone text 'bombs'

    The CNN article correctly explains that every mobile device has a built-in
    serial number (IMEI). Cellphone operators can block all use of a mobile
    handset based on this IMEI.

    Here in Belgium we have one operator that blocks stolen IMEIs and two
    others that do not (it would cost them money). The result is that all the
    "new owners" of stolen cellphones are calling via the lazy/cheap operators.

    In the Amsterdam scenario, the taxpayers are funding the police to do the
    work of private cellphone operators.

    Peter Chuck, Consultant, Cap Gemini Ernst & Young, Brussels, Belgium.


    Date: Mon, 02 Apr 2001 21:17:56 -0500
    From: "Craig S. Cottingham" <cottinghammac.com>
    Subject: Re: Future Mac Viruses? (PC Rescue, RISKS-21.32)

    > Mac users have been crowing for some time that their system is less prone to
    > viruses than the horrible alternative. Could this be about to change?

    First off, any person who claims that Mac OS is less *susceptible* to
    viruses than the "horrible alternative" is mistaken. The greater part of Mac
    OS's relative dearth of viruses is due to "security through obscurity" -- in
    this case, a much smaller developer base. All the tools you need to write
    code for Mac OS, virulent or not, have been freely available for download
    from Apple's web site for more than two years.

    > "The box contains three installation CDs -- Mac OS X, Mac OS 9.1 and a CD
    > full of developer tools, including the Cocoa programming environment, which
    > is reportedly simple enough for school kids to use."

    Secondly, Linux has included, from day one, developer tools simple enough
    for school kids to use, as evidenced by the number of open source projects
    started by students. (The most notable example that comes to mind is
    Napster; I believe its author was a high school student when he created it.)
    Following that logic, there should be a preponderance of viruses for Linux.
    Instead, there are, to my knowledge, none. (Worms which exploit security
    holes in daemons are a horse -- a Trojan horse? -- of a different color.)

    The security model built into Linux and other Unix-like operating systems --
    of which BSD, on which Mac OS X is built, is one -- contrasts sharply with
    the security model, such as it is, built into the variants of Windows. So
    right from the start, Mac OS X is starting from ground more solid than
    either its predecessor or that "horrible alternative."

    What remains to be seen is how well Apple has balanced the Unix-like
    security model with the expectations of a user base that is used to having
    free run of the machine. I haven't installed Mac OS X on any of my machines
    yet, but it appears from the posts to one OS X mailing list that the
    security model is obvious for tasks which require superuser rights.

    Craig S. Cottingham <cottinghammac.com>


    Date: Wed, 4 Apr 2001 16:12:23 -0400 (EDT)
    From: <hesselspashaman.dhs.org>
    Subject: Re: Future Mac Viruses? (PC Rescue, RISKS-21.32)

    >Mac users have been crowing for some time that their system is
    >less prone to viruses than the horrible alternative. Could this
    >be about to change?

    Considering Mac OS X is running FreeBSD, I don't expect virii to be any MORE
    of a problem then from their legacy OS. Its pretty hard to write a virus
    that trashes a whole FreeBSD system.

    I don't expect that having an IDE that is so easy kids can use will make any
    noticeable difference...

    Now worms on the other hand.....



    Date: Tue, 3 Apr 2001 09:35:39 +0100
    From: "Julian White" <JWhiteNu-D.com>
    Subject: Re: "Internet Voting is no 'Magic Ballot'" (Ashworth, RISKS-21.32)

    I must agree with Jay on this one. Ensuring that the Internet vote
    originates from who it claims to be is not wholly solvable at this time. To
    many issues around the security of this information (whether that be
    originality, transmission or storage) make it too risky to implement for
    such an important process. Also, the flip side of adding complex security is
    that if the Government were able to validate a vote against a voter, they
    then will have the ability to collect information on a voter's voting habit.
    I suspect that this is something that many of us would find unacceptable
    behaviour on behalf of our esteemed Government staff. For those of us with
    data protection and/or privacy laws we would at least have legislation to
    strangle the Government with, for those of you without there will not be
    much you could do to stop it.

    However this does not mean we should exclude "electronic" voting. One can
    see the advantages of collecting the voting information electronically
    direct from the ballot box. Replacing the paper based system with an
    electronic counter would produce a more accurate result, faster. The
    verification of the voter is done as per normal, by turning up to the ballot
    station. Of course we need to ensure that the voting tallies are not
    tampered with, which is probably more procedural than technical.

    The critical issues with electronic voting are those as described by Jurek
    Kirakowski [RISKS-21.32], namely the user interface. This will be an issue
    for the technical, social and psychologist arenas to solve as a collective.

    Julian White, Nu-Dimensions, UK. JWhiteNu-D.com


    Date: Tue, 3 Apr 2001 05:16:15 -0400
    From: "Jay R. Ashworth" <jrabaylink.com>
    Subject: Re: "Internet Voting is no 'Magic Ballot'" (RISKS-21.32)

    Another method of counting can certainly be *added* to "paper"... but
    note what I said about "a physical object that the voter can inspect".

    And that can *be* recounted; the more important issue.
    Paper cannot be abandoned. Merely augmented.

    Jay R. Ashworth <jrabaylink.com> Baylink The Suncoast Freenet, Tampa Bay FL
    http://baylink.pitas.com +1 727 804 5015


    Date: Tue, 10 Apr 2001 22:00:44 -0400 (EDT)
    From: Rebecca Mercuri <mercurigradient.cis.upenn.edu>
    Subject: Bathtub Burnout (Re: Nordal, RISKS-21.33)

    > The risk of putting non-reliable legacy equipment in the same room
    > as your $30,000 servers with hundreds of concurrent users is obvious.

    Audun Nordal's conclusion is a tad misleading. Anyone who has taken a
    reliability engineering course (do they still teach such things anywhere?)
    knows that the "bathtub curve function" indicates that it is at BOTH ends of
    the equipment age spectrum where the increased possibility of breakdown
    exists. New equipment burn-in (note the full meaning of this terminology)
    eliminates many of the front-end problems, but I'd suspect that brand-new
    $30,000 servers (with defective CRT monitors) probably are at least as risky
    as the workhorse VT420s.

    Rebecca Mercuri


    Date: Thu, 5 Apr 2001 08:34:11 -0400
    From: Graystreak <wexmedia.mit.edu>
    Subject: Auto-updating and ReplayTV

    It has been pointed out to me that Tog's column, which I referenced in
    RISKS-21.32 is (4) months out of date. The malfeature Tog talks
    about was removed, apparently, last December.

    That does not, I think, obviate my major point. I was _not_ trying to say:
         "ReplayTV is bad"
    but rather
         "we have opened ourselves up to a whole new class of risks" through a
         combination of always-on/always-connected computers, and
         auto-updating software.

    Risks Digest is a fine forum for presentation and analysis of specific
    cases; however, part of the point of such cases - I think - is to
    illustrate larger classes of risks and systemic design flaws which can
    lead to multiple vulnerabilities.

    Alan Wexelblat wexmedia.mit.edu http://wex.www.media.mit.edu/people/wex/
    moderator, rec.arts.sf.reviews


    Date: 12 Feb 2001 (LAST-MODIFIED)
    From: RISKS-requestcsl.sri.com
    Subject: Abridged info on RISKS (comp.risks)

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       [volume-summary issues are in risks-*.00]
       [back volumes have their own subdirectories, e.g., "cd 20" for volume 20]
     http://catless.ncl.ac.uk/Risks/VL.IS.html [i.e., VoLume, ISsue].
       Lindsay Marshall has also added to the Newcastle catless site a
       palmtop version of the most recent RISKS issue and a WAP version that
       works for many but not all telephones: http://catless.ncl.ac.uk/w/r
     http://the.wiretapped.net/security/info/textfiles/risks-digest/ .
     http://www.planetmirror.com/pub/risks/ ftp://ftp.planetmirror.com/pub/risks/
    ==> PGN's comprehensive historical Illustrative Risks summary of one liners:
        http://www.csl.sri.com/illustrative.html for browsing,
        http://www.csl.sri.com/illustrative.pdf or .ps for printing


    End of RISKS-FORUM Digest 21.34