Neohapsis is currently accepting applications for employment. For more information, please visit our website www.neohapsis.com or email hr@neohapsis.com
From: RISKS List Owner (riskocsl.sri.com)
Date: Thu Aug 02 2001 - 16:13:38 CDT

  • Messages sorted by: [ date ] [ thread ] [ subject ] [ author ]

    RISKS-LIST: Risks-Forum Digest Thursday 2 August 2001 Volume 21 : Issue 56

       ACM Committee on Computers and Public Policy, Peter G. Neumann, moderator

    ***** See last item for further information, disclaimers, caveats, etc. *****
    This issue is archived at <URL:http://catless.ncl.ac.uk/Risks/21.56.html>
    and by anonymous ftp at ftp.sri.com, cd risks .

    NASA data from 1970s lost due to "forgotten" file format (Aaron Dickey)
    Motorola Stock Drops 99.95%! (Daniel Norton)
    JDS Uniphase quarterly results hacked? NO! (Dave Isaacs)
    Freeware app to retrieve passwords from Internet Explorer (Lyle H. Gray)
    Totally Hip with spyware (Michael F. Maggard)
    Medical records via e-mail (William Colburn)
    AS IF: draft-ietf-dnsext-ad-is-secure-03.txt (John Gilmore)
    Microsoft's PGP keys don't verify (Brian McWilliams)
    Telling all to the police (Norm deCarteret)
    Identity theft (Jack Holleran)
    Risks of profanity filtering (Paul Bissex)
    Car-door lock remote control activates another car's alarm (Mark Brader)
    S-not-SL (Mike Albaugh)
    Re: MSN security upgrade forces new e-mail address (Robert J. Woodhead)
    No Appleplexy needed (Dave Stringer-Calvert)
    Re: Autoresponder goes haywire (Richard Johnson)
    Re: Erroneous air navigation reading (Mike James)
    Re: Polarized sunglasses and LCD frustration (Chris J Dixon)
    Abridged info on RISKS (comp.risks)


    Date: Sat, 28 Jul 2001 23:31:43 -0700 (PDT)
    From: Aaron Dickey <wnnaaronyahoo.com>
    Subject: NASA data from 1970s lost due to "forgotten" file format

    In 1999, USC neurobiologist Joseph Miller asked NASA to check some old data
    the Viking probes had sent back from Mars in the mid-1970s. Miller wanted to
    find out whether certain information on gas released by Martian soil, which
    at the time had been dismissed as meaningless "chemical activity," was
    actually evidence of microbial life. NASA found the tapes he requested, but
    they didn't find any way to read them. It turns out that the data, despite
    being only about 25 years old, was in a format NASA had long since forgotten
    about. Or, as Miller puts it, "The programmers who knew it had died."

    Luckily, Miller has been able to cobble together about a third of the data
    and get some useful results, but only because some form of printed record
    had been saved. (And yes, he does believe the Viking probes turned up
    evidence of microbes.)

    Source: Reuters. Original article is available, at least temporarily, at
    <http://reuters.activebuddy.com/s?id=DS1DEKNG8BBN>, or


    Date: Thu, 02 Aug 2001 10:17:06 -0400
    From: Daniel Norton <danortonsuespammers.org>
    Subject: Motorola Stock Drops 99.95%!

    My Yahoo! alerts window popped up with an explosive sound this morning to
    notify me that Motorola's stock (MOT NYSE) value crashed. Incredulous, I
    went to the Yahoo! Finance page and confirmed it. Undaunted, I proceeded to
    the NY Times finance site which only concurred. Finally the NYSE site
    confirmed that, in fact, the value of MOT had been exactly one penny
    (US$0.01) at the open, but rebounded spectacularly, even to exceed the
    previous day's close! (cf. http://www.danielnorton.net/mot.gif )

    Hopefully, anyone who automates trading programs around this kind of
    glitch (It _was_ a glitch, wasn't it?), but we RISKs readers know that
    such hopes aren't always fulfilled.

    Daniel Norton


    Date: Mon, 30 Jul 2001 09:39:49 -0400
    From: Dave Isaacs <dave.isaacsentrust.com>
    Subject: JDS Uniphase quarterly results hacked? NO!

    I saw this interesting aside in an *Ottawa Citizen* article (27 Jul 2001)
    about JDS Uniphase's latest quarterly results:
    "The world's largest maker of fibre optic components was forced to halt the
    trading of its stock for most of the afternoon yesterday because a hacker
    broke into its corporate network and stole a draft copy of the company's
    fourth-quarter results. It had been released before the markets closed
    yesterday afternoon."
    The article is at

    The obvious risk here is the consequences of storing very valuable
    information unencrypted on a network-accessible computer. Nothing new in
    that lesson. What would be interesting is knowing is *how* JDS Uniphase
    knew that this break-in had occurred, and what form the break-in took. It
    sounded like a story we'd all be interested in hearing.

    A further article, from the *Globe & Mail* (28 Jul 2001), with the rather
    convoluted URL of
    contains more details. Apparently, there was no 'hacker' or 'break-in'.
    JDS had placed the release on their Web site. A sharp-eyed surfer noticed
    that if you type in the exact file name, up pop the results. I suspect that
    a document-naming convention was apparent from looking at previous financial

    As to how JSU found out about the 'break-in': the 'hacker' phoned them up
    and told them.

    Dave Isaacs <dave.isaacsottawa.com>

      [JDS apparently reported a $51 billion loss for the year ending 30 Jun
      2001, and 16,000 jobs lost. PGN]


    Date: Mon, 23 Jul 2001 22:24:15 -0400 (EDT)
    From: "Lyle H. Gray" <graycs.umass.edu>
    Subject: Freeware app to retrieve passwords from Internet Explorer

    The following item appeared in the "Download This" section of the
    Earthlink Weekly Email Newsletter on 07/23/2001:

    * Windows: Password Recovery
    If you tell your browser to save Web site passwords so that you
    don't have to reenter them, you might forget those passwords over
    time. This program can reveal the passwords hidden behind those
    asterisks in Web site login screens. (Freeware)

    This item highlights an inherent risk of allowing IE to save your passwords
    (other than the obvious one that anyone with physical access to your system
    would also have access to your password-protected pages): Someone with
    access to your system may be able to determine a pattern to your password
    choices (especially if you only have one password...)

      [and also to use your IE passwords directly while masquerading... PGN]


    Date: Tue, 31 Jul 2001 17:32:24 -0400
    From: "Michael F. Maggard" <mbearbigfoot.com>
    Subject: Totally hip with spyware

    Recently it was discovered that the Mac software "Livestage Pro" by Totally
    Hip software has been reporting back its license, usage, and environment to
    its manufacturer via a covert http dialogue.

    The company has refused to respond to the discovery "officially", but one of
    their staff members has been corresponding publicly on the popular Mac
    website at http://www.macintouch.com/spyware.html. There he's expressed
    surprise that anyone is concerned and asserts his business has the full
    right to include this sort of tracking, that it is noted deep in one of the
    readme files and permission to "electronically verify their serial number "
    is specified within the software license.

    The non-representative goes on to state that in the future Totally Hip
    intends to somehow secure the collected information and this is all simply a
    legitimate anti-piracy effort. Finally he's taken the Web site to task for
    posting letters that detail how to block the reporting function (edit one's
    hosts file), likens it to supporting software piracy and closes with
    "Honestly we are not an evil conspiring company."

    This isn't an isolated incident for Mac software developers; powerhouse
    Adobe has been installing a mysterious file of their own that regularly
    "calls home" for reasons unknown. Adobe has promised to explain this new
    feature, what it does and what it is communicating but to date have not
    followed through.


    Date: Mon, 30 Jul 2001 15:31:52 -0600
    From: "Schlake ( William Colburn )" <schlakenmt.edu>
    Subject: Medical records via e-mail

    I live in a small town. Two of the doctors I visit have been my doctors my
    entire life, and the third in the office has been a friend of the family
    just as long. The office has been run virtually the same my entire life
    (they still have the original monochrome monitors on their office PCs). The
    newest doctor, however, demanded some new-fangled ideas as part of her
    contract to work there. She makes recordings of her medical notes and they
    are transcribed by a third party company. The transcriptions come via
    e-mail (which the office can't receive) in MS word 2000 (which the office
    can't read), so she gets them at her house and prints them out. She is out
    of town for three weeks now, and they asked me to take care of this for
    them. I don't know if my experience is typical of the medical transcription
    business, but I suspect that it is.

    The transcriptions are made at the office from the doctor reading her notes
    onto tape. I didn't ask, but I suspect that the tape is then mailed or
    shipped to the transcription agency. The employee there then types up the
    information and e-mails it back out to the "appropriate place". The e-mail
    is not (cryptographically) signed, nor is it encrypted. In the case of my
    local office, it goes from the ISP of the person doing the work to a local
    ISP here in Socorro. The doctor has a wireless link from her house to the
    ISP and uses an unencrypted POP session. The transcripts are then launched
    from outlook into word, and printed out. She saves a local copy onto her
    hard disk (just in case) and deletes them from the server.

    These documents can contain a lot of information. A medical history will
    include tremendous personal data on not just the patient, but on their
    entire family, including date of birth and lifestyle. A simple office visit
    can be mundanely bland (a broken wrist) to life-shatteringly personal
    (someone here was inspired by "Bobbit"), but always contains the persons
    real name, complaint, diagnoses, and prescription.

    There are numerous places along the trip that this information could fall
    into the wrong hands. A virus could be present at either end of the e-mail
    which might compromise data. The data passes through ISPs in the clear, and
    could be intercepted or modified while in transit. The wireless ISP is like
    a scrolling marquee if someone has the right equipment. Outlook likes to
    "keep e-mail on the server" even if the user has deleted it, so all those
    transcripts could still be on the local ISP. And lastly, a copy of
    everything is stored on her computer in her house and not in the security of
    the office.

    I often tell people that I have "no delusions of privacy" in our modern
    world. It keeps me sane.


    Date: Sat, 28 Jul 2001 12:16:53 -0700
    From: John Gilmore <gnutoad.com>
    Subject: AS IF: draft-ietf-dnsext-ad-is-secure-03.txt

    I think some of you guys have gotten so tied up in micromanaging DNS
    Security implementation details that you forgot what swamp we were trying to

    There is no point in building a cryptographically-secured DNS in which many
    of the machines will be configured to "just believe whatever they are told,
    regardless of the cryptographic signatures"!

    We already have such a DNS -- today's. It doesn't need signatures or
    AD bits or big packets or any other changes. Anyone who is happy
    with that can go home and stop arguing. The rest of us are interested
    in the real security and integrity of the Internet.

    Any client implementation that listens to a single bit of the response to
    tell it whether the response is cryptographically valid must be considered
    noncompliant with the DNSSEC spec. It's just an old fashioned insecure DNS
    client. There's nothing wrong with that, as long as you don't have any high
    trust expections for it.

    Any server which deposits a single bit in the response to claim to clients
    that it has cryptographically validated the results, so they don't have to,
    is just encouraging the above abuse.

    I'm not shocked to find people advocating that such a server actually
    lie to the clients about whether it has validated the data. The
    entire model (trusting a packet to tell you whether somebody else has
    validated the data) provides ample opportunities for not only your
    friends but your enemies to lie to you. Just like in the current DNS.


    PS: I know, I know, the "valid" bit will be secured by some "out of band"
    means. Like a shared static key, and/or by the security of the file system
    on the server. Right. For extra credit: composing several weak security
    primitives produces what? Strong security or weak security?

    PPS: The real question is why anyone is advocating that the DNS be "secured"
    by lame security. There are challenges aplenty even when you're working
    with strong primitives; trying to mix in weak stuff is just wasting
    everyone's time. People have encouraged me in the past to assume the
    possibility of mere incompetence rather than assuming actual malice
    (e.g. when the FBI's Louis Freeh testified to Congress about the security of
    DES). So: Were any of you on the standards committees for cellphone
    privacy? How about on the 802.11 "Wiretap Equivalent Privacy" committee?
    Did any of you have a hand in shortening the key in DES? Perhaps you
    designed the encryption scheme used in DVDs or in Adobe eBooks? Whether
    you're incompetent or malicious, stick to breaking codes, it's much easier.
    Especially when you break them in the standards committee before they're


    Date: Thu, 26 Jul 2001 15:33:10 -0400
    From: Brian McWilliams <brianpc-radio.com>
    Subject: Microsoft's PGP keys don't verify

      [From Dave Farber's IP, archived at
      Submitted by Ben Laurie, who commented that
        As the immortal phrase has it, "the RISKS are obvious."

    FYI ...

    Microsoft Bulletins Fail PGP Verification

    For at least four months, Microsoft has been sending out security bulletins
    which fail a popular e-mail authentication system. As a result, the company
    could be opening the door to counterfeit bulletins from malicious hackers.

    To protect against forgery, Microsoft's security response center digitally
    signs its bulletins with PGP before e-mailing them to subscribers of its
    security notification service. But since at least March, if recipients
    attempt to verify the messages' authenticity, PGP will issue a warning that
    the bulletins contain an invalid signature.

    "The problem is that Microsoft's bulletins effectively look as if they're
    forged. And telling a Microsoft forgery from someone else's is virtually
    impossible," said Paul Murphy, head of information technology at Gemini
    Genomics, a genetic research firm in Cambridge, England. [...]


    Date: Fri, 27 Jul 2001 18:06:01 -0400
    From: Norm <nsdecmercurylink.net>
    Subject: Telling all to the police

    *The New York Times* reports (27 Jul 2001) on 17 Jul theft from 9 lockers at
    an upper East Side sports club. Directly after they called the police a
    call was received from "the police fraud department" and 4 victims responded
    to a series of questions and gave their credit card numbers, husbands names,
    SSN, PINs and mothers' maiden names. Anything wrong with that? That is,
    aside from when the police did arrived they said there is no such dept.

    One womans tale: she called the credit card issuers but couldn't reach
    her bank, being after hours and all. The next morning she found $500
    had been taken using her bank card.

    The Risk, stupidity or cupidity aside, is being unlucky enough to be a
    victim outside bankers hours ... and in a bank not having a 24-hour
    notification phone#. There Oughta Be A Law, as credit cards, that limits
    consumer loss to $50 for such cases.

    (PS: the same woman said she had worked out daily until then but "Now I am
    so paranoid I haven't been back". That's probably the wrong lesson

    Norm deCarteret NSDEC Inc


    Date: Fri, 27 Jul 2001 00:12:26 -0400
    From: Jack Holleran <Holleransevernapark.com>
    Subject: Identity theft

    It would interesting to see what the vetting process was for the
    salesperson(s)? There seems to be an incredible amount of information that
    was revealed without (m)any controls in place.

      Huge identity theft uncovered; Files with Social Security and driver's
      license numbers pasted in chat room; possible link to cell phone
      applications, By Bob Sullivan, MSNBC, 25 Jul 2001

      Key personal data belonging to hundreds of individuals have been shared in
      an Internet chat room, in what one expert says could become one of the
      largest identity-theft cases ever. The data include Social Security
      numbers, driver's license numbers, date of birth and credit card
      information - everything a criminal would need to open an online bank
      account, apply for a credit card, even create the paperwork necessary to
      smuggle illegal immigrants. It is still unclear how the data ended up in
      the chat room, but an MSNBC.com investigation has revealed common threads
      among the victims - including the purchase of a cell phone online from
      VerizonWireless.com or an AT&T Wireless reseller.
      Full text of the article can be found at


    Date: Thu, 19 Jul 2001 20:36:19 -0400
    From: Paul Bissex <pbe-scribe.com>
    Subject: Risks of profanity filtering

    Observant readers will have already noted that my last name contains the
    word "sex." Recently, in trying to register with a Web site -- using my real
    name -- I was chastised for "profanity" and asked to choose a different ID.

    I declined, and since the company has offered no response to my inquiry as
    to whether this policy is really necessary, I thought I'd share the screen


    The business risk, alienating customers, is fairly obvious. More broadly,
    this highlights a familiar problem with "bad-word list" censorware. Imagine
    if this were an e-mail filter on a firewall instead of a registration

    Paul Bissex, CEO, e-scribe.com


    Date: Tue, 31 Jul 2001 17:51:01 -0400 (EDT)
    From: msbvex.net (Mark Brader)
    Subject: Car-door lock remote control activates another car's alarm

      [The following was posted by "K.D." <kayemmdeehotmail.com> in
      alt.fan.cecil-adams; forwarded to Risks by Mark Brader with the
      author's permission.]

    On at least three occasions, my battery-operated car unlock remote control
    set off the car alarms in nearby vehicles. I found that I could turn on the
    alarm, and with another press of the remote control, turn it off. Ad

    The most astounding of these was the first time it happened (in Rochester,
    NY). But not simply because this was new information that I could set off
    the car alarm. Rather, because of the reaction of the owner of the other

    At first, I didn't realize how it was that the nearby car alarm had been
    triggered, since neither we or anyone else was close to the vehicle.
    Eventually, I figured out that *I* had done it with my remote control. I
    also figured out that I could turn the alarm off as well as turn it on.

    As we continued to approach my car, it also dawned on me that the owner of
    the vehicle in question was also coming across the lot. I pointed to the
    previously alarm-sounding vehicle, and asked if it was his. He said that it
    was. Lest he had observed what had just occurred and somehow thought I was
    up to no good, I said, "It seems that my remote control activates your car
    alarm." His response? "I don't have a car alarm." I looked at my sister,
    who was as perplexed as I was, and decided not to argue / explain.

    Perhaps I should mention that there was no other vehicle nearby that could
    have been sounding the alarm. It was not my vehicle. Especially now that
    it has happened two other times, I am sure my remote control triggered his

    One bummer about this is thus: You open your car door. The other person's
    alarm goes off. You press the remote control again to shut off the alarm
    and naturally your car door locks again. So, you have to unlock your car
    door, the alarm of the other car goes off, you open your car door so you can
    get in your car, and then you press the remote control again to shut off the
    other car alarm.

    I suppose if you just gave the alarm enough time, it would shut off on its

    [K.D. then posted this followup]

    In re-reading my post, I realized that this is screwed up. Yes, when you
    hit the remote control again ("unlock"), the door lock makes a sound.
    However, I now realize that it isn't re-locking -- just making that
    unlocking sound again.

    I think. At the time (second incident), I recall that when I tried to get
    into my car after turning off the other person's car alarm, I found that my
    door was locked. Duh -- I had just unlocked it. I then assumed that I had
    relocked my car door, even though I had presumably used "unlock" to turn off
    the alarm, as that is the button I had used that resulted in the alarm
    turning on.

    Damn -- if and when this happens again (so far, three times in about as many
    months), I'll have to study the phenomenon more closely.



    Date: Mon, 23 Jul 2001 16:07:25 -0700 (PDT)
    From: Mike Albaugh <albaughspies.com>
    Subject: S-not-SL (Re: SSL, RISKS-21.53,54)

    I have found the following analogy useful, explaining to laypersons the
    "Security policy" most common on the Web:

      "Imagine a restaurant that assigns armed guards to escort your credit-card
      to the cash-register and back, then tacks all the carbons to the
      employee-bulletin-board, right inside an un-locked back door"

    Most of them get it immediately.


    Date: Mon, 23 Jul 2001 19:52:39 -0400
    From: "Robert J. Woodhead (AnimEigo)" <treboranimeigo.com>
    Subject: Re: MSN security upgrade forces new e-mail address (Silberman, R-21.54)

    "Ami A. Silberman" <silbermitre.org> wrote:
    >The risk? MSN's attempt to improve security (apparently by forcing spammers
    >to modify their software to change fake msn addresses) has resulted in
    >additional burden on list administrators.

    You think that's bad? I've been maintaining a bounce-management tool for a
    mac-based listserv app, and as such, I see a lot of weird bounce formats,
    many of which make the extraction of the bouncing e-mail address quite a

    But the all-time champ is a certain large ISP who shall remain nameless but
    whose initials are a,o & l. If one of their users has redirected his e-mail
    to another ISP, and the final destination e-mail address bounces, then our
    friendly large ISP sends a polite bounce message back that clearly contains
    the final destination e-mail address.

    Alas, since it doesn't contain the original destination e-mail address, it is
    impossible to determine who to unsubscribe; forevermore, you have a "zombie"
    in your mailing list.

    The listserv, alas, doesn't attach a useful header like
    "Original-Recipient:" that could be used to identify the zombie because it
    tries to conserve bandwidth by grouping e-mails to the same domain name into
    a single transaction.

    If mail servers added an "Original-Recipient:" header if they have to
    forward the e-mail (and there isn't already one in the headers), life would
    be immeasurably easier for bounce management. A standard for bounce
    reporting that made life easy for nonhumans would also seem to be an obvious

    Needless to say, an e-mail to the large ISP mentioning the issue seems
    to have gotten sucked into a black hole.

    Robert Woodhead, CEO, AnimEigo http://www.animeigo.com/
    http://selfpromotion.com/ The Net's only URL registration SHARESERVICE.


    Date: Tue, 31 Jul 2001 16:13:52 -0700
    From: Dave Stringer-Calvert <dave_sccsl.sri.com>
    Subject: No Appleplexy needed (Re: RISKS-21.55)

    The Apple-DNS-hacked item in the latest risks is not a hack - it's a
    "legitimate" use of the NIC records. Someone has registered hosts with
    the NIC who just happen to have apple.com in their name. The same thing
    has been done to Microsoft:

      ; whois microsoft.comwhois.internic.net

      [... and so on into the night]

         [This was noted by MANY readers. TNX. Sorry for my immoderate lapse.


    Date: Sun, 22 Jul 2001 11:21:43 -0600 (MDT)
    From: rjohnsonucar.edu
    Subject: Re: Autoresponder goes haywire (Bieber, RISKS-21.51)

    In RISKS-21.51, Joshua M Bieber mentioned the following problems that led to
    a quite typical autoresponder flood of one of his mailing lists. In
    addition to the suggested protective measures, it may also be wise for the
    list to send with the original sender's address as the From/Reply address,
    instead of using the list broadcast address there. That way, only one
    person gets nailed with the inappropriate autoresponse. That's still
    unacceptable behavior, but at least the damage is less severe that way.

    Better yet, however, is deleting that bogus autoresponder software. Any
    autoresponder that replies to a message where:

        1) the Precedence header indicates Bulk or List, or where
        2) the user's address does -not- appear in the To or Cc header

    is broken software. The author of such an autoresponder should at least be
    hauled out behind the barn for a strapping.

    The problem illustrated by Guilty Person, in cahoots with the author of the
    broken autoresponder used, is that of continually rewriting the same piece
    of software with the same old mistakes. In this case, it's particularly
    ludicrous; properly operating examples of 'vacation' have been available
    for free for 20 years.

    Richard Johnson


    Date: Mon, 23 Jul 2001 21:54:24 +0100
    From: Mike James <mikehamble.demon.co.uk>
    Subject: Re: Erroneous air navigation reading (Hopkins, RISKS-21.53)

    That description of an aircraft navigation system out by 14 degrees on a
    bearing posted by Bill Hopkins reminds me of a 'trick' I played on myself.

    Take one Garmin GPS 12(XL),38,45,48 .... Probably most handheld GPS units.

    Set user compass variation...

      setup->navigation->heading->user and enter 180 degrees

    Now navigate to a waypoint. The bearing to waypoint will be displayed as
    asked, but 180 degrees out. The 'compass' display arrow correctly
    contradicts the bearing given.

    This is confusing but totally correct. Just be careful....

    Smaller numbers would be less obvious as in the aircraft case.

    I was only yacht racing in the Solent and the error was obvious. Crashing
    off a mountain by using a magnetic compass and a GPS misconfigured like this
    could be worse. (standing still need magnetic compass for current heading)


    Date: Fri, 27 Jul 2001 19:06:45 +0100
    From: Chris J Dixon <chris.dixoneasynet.co.uk>
    Subject: Re: Polarized sunglasses and LCD frustration (Boyd, RISKS-21.54)

    Surely it is the other way round. Displays are not fussy about the
    polarisation angle, but sunglasses are specifically oriented so that they
    are most effective at intercepting light reflected off (and polarised by)
    horizontal surfaces.

    Chris J Dixon Nottingham UK <chris.dixoneasynet.co.uk>


    Date: 12 Feb 2001 (LAST-MODIFIED)
    From: RISKS-requestcsl.sri.com
    Subject: Abridged info on RISKS (comp.risks)

     The RISKS Forum is a MODERATED digest. Its Usenet equivalent is comp.risks.
    => SUBSCRIPTIONS: PLEASE read RISKS as a newsgroup (comp.risks or equivalent)
     if possible and convenient for you. Alternatively, via majordomo,
     send e-mail requests to <risks-requestcsl.sri.com> with one-line body
       subscribe [OR unsubscribe]
     which requires your confirmation to majordomoCSL.sri.com .
     [If E-mail address differs from FROM: subscribe "other-address <xy>" ;
     this requires PGN's intervention -- but hinders spamming subscriptions, etc.]
     Lower-case only in address may get around a confirmation match glitch.
       INFO [for unabridged version of RISKS information]
     There seems to be an occasional glitch in the confirmation process, in which
     case send mail to RISKS with a suitable SUBJECT and we'll do it manually.
       .MIL users should contact <risks-requestpica.army.mil> (Dennis Rears).
       .UK users should contact <Lindsay.Marshallnewcastle.ac.uk>.
    => The INFO file (submissions, default disclaimers, archive sites,
     copyright policy, PRIVACY digests, etc.) is also obtainable from
     http://www.CSL.sri.com/risksinfo.html ftp://www.CSL.sri.com/pub/risks.info
     The full info file will appear now and then in future issues. *** All
     contributors are assumed to have read the full info file for guidelines. ***
    => SUBMISSIONS: to risksCSL.sri.com with meaningful SUBJECT: line.
    => ARCHIVES are available: ftp://ftp.sri.com/risks or
     ftp ftp.sri.com<CR>login anonymous<CR>[YourNetAddress]<CR>cd risks
       [volume-summary issues are in risks-*.00]
       [back volumes have their own subdirectories, e.g., "cd 20" for volume 20]
     http://catless.ncl.ac.uk/Risks/VL.IS.html [i.e., VoLume, ISsue].
       Lindsay Marshall has also added to the Newcastle catless site a
       palmtop version of the most recent RISKS issue and a WAP version that
       works for many but not all telephones: http://catless.ncl.ac.uk/w/r
     http://the.wiretapped.net/security/info/textfiles/risks-digest/ .
     http://www.planetmirror.com/pub/risks/ ftp://ftp.planetmirror.com/pub/risks/
    ==> PGN's comprehensive historical Illustrative Risks summary of one liners:
        http://www.csl.sri.com/illustrative.html for browsing,
        http://www.csl.sri.com/illustrative.pdf or .ps for printing


    End of RISKS-FORUM Digest 21.56