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From: The SANS Institute (CriticalVulnerabilityAnalysis_at_sans.org)
Date: Mon Oct 21 2002 - 12:58:01 CDT
From: Alan Paller, Director of Research, SANS
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SANS Critical Vulnerability Analysis
October 21, 2002 Vol. 1. No. 13
*****************************************************************
Summary: Every week, the CVA prioritizes and summarizes the most
important vulnerabilities identified during the past week and provides
data on actions taken by security and systems managers at fifteen
very large organizations (the Council) to protect their computers
and networks from exploits of the reported vulnerabilities. In
other words it tells you where actions are needed and eliminates the
need for you to search out details on all the new vulnerabilities.
Please forward this note to anyone who has security and system
administration responsibility. They can register to get it themselves
at https://server2.sans.org/sansnews
See "About the CVA Process and Council" at the end of this note for
more data on how the report is compiled.
******************************************************************
Widely Deployed Software
=========================
(1) Moderate: Outlook Express S/MIME Parsing Buffer Overflow
Other Software
===============
(2) Moderate: Linux Heartbeat Daemon Format String Overflow
(3) Moderate: Syslog-NG Daemon Macro Expansion Buffer Overflow
(4) Moderate: MySimpleNews CGI Suite Multiple Vulnerabilities
Exploit Codes
==============
(5) Windows 2000 NetDDE LOCAL/SYSTEM Privilege Escalation Exploit
*******************************
Widely Deployed Software
*******************************
(1) Moderate: Outlook Express S/MIME Parsing Buffer Overflow
Affected Products:
Microsoft Outlook Express 5.5 and 6.0
Earlier Outlook Express versions may also be affected.
Description:
The certificate verification function of Outlook Express incorrectly
parses malformed S/MIME certificates on incoming email, allowing a
malicious email to execute arbitrary code on the user's system.
Risk: Windows system compromise with the privileges of the Outlook
Express user opening or previewing a hostile email. Also a potential
to cause the mail client to fail.
Deployment: Huge.
Outlook Express is a very popular email client for Windows that ships
as part of Internet Explorer. By default Outlook Express is installed
on every Windows system.
Ease of Exploitation: Standard.
An attacker must send a specially crafted email that contains a
malformed S/MIME certificate. If some aspect of the certificate
contains overlong data, a buffer is overflowed in Outlook Express.
An attacker can vulnerability the problem by trying different
certificate values and noticing when the software crashes.
Status: Vendor confirmed, patch available.
A fix for this issue is also included in Windows XP SP1 and IE 6.0 SP1.
References:
Microsoft Security Advisory:
http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/bulletin/MS02-058.asp
http://archives.neohapsis.com/archives/microsoft/2002-q4/0004.html
SecurityFocus Vulnerability Information:
http://online.securityfocus.com/bid/5944
Council Site Actions:
Outlook Express is not in wide-spread use at council sites. Most of
the council sites stated however, that the software was most likely
installed on a large number of hosts within their organizations.
Most of the reporting council sites have notified their desktop
support group to include the patch during the next regularly scheduled
patch update.
*******************************
Other Software
*******************************
(2) Moderate: Linux Heartbeat Daemon Format String Overflow
Affected Products:
Linux. SuSE and Debian have included the vulnerable software
in past distributions.
Description:
The heartbeat daemon used for high-availability Linux clusters has
been found to contain various exploitable format string vulnerabilities
which enable a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code on the system
with root privileges.
Assessment:
Risk: Remote root compromise.
Deployment: Moderate.
The vulnerable daemon is included with some standard Linux
distributions, but is not enabled by default.
Ease of Exploitation: Unknown.
According to SuSE, the attacker must send malicious UDP packets to the
UDP port heartbeat is listening on -- 694/udp by default. According
to Debian, the attacker must send "specially crafted TCP packets"
to exploit the bug.
Status: The vulnerability has been confirmed by SuSE and Debian.
Both have released updated software to fix the problem. In addition,
SuSE recommends blocking traffic to the heartbeat port at the network
perimeter.
References:
SuSE:
http://archives.neohapsis.com/archives/linux/suse/2002-q4/0203.html
Debian:
http://archives.neohapsis.com/archives/linux/debian/2002-q4/0224.html
SecurityFocus Vulnerability Information:
http://online.securityfocus.com/bid/5955
Council Site Actions:
One of the reporting council sites is running the vulnerable software.
This site has sent notification to its Linux support group as an FYI.
The other council sites reported no action taken.
==============================================================
(3) Moderate: Syslog-NG Daemon Macro Expansion Buffer Overflow
Affected Products:
Syslog-NG versions 1.5.20 (development), 1.4.15 (stable) and prior
Description:
The syslog-NG daemon does not properly expand macro strings in
configuration templates, leading to a remotely exploitable buffer
overflow which can execute arbitrary code under certain configurations.
Assessment:
Risk: Remote root compromise.
Deployment: Small.
Ease of Exploitation: Unknown.
The syslog-NG server must be configured to use templated filenames or
templated output to be vulnerable. The specifics of how to exploit the
vulnerability depend on the exact template being used. The attacker
can send maliciously crafted log messages to the server to cause the
buffer overflow.
Status: Vendor confirmed, patch available.
References:
Vendor statement and patches:
http://archives.neohapsis.com/archives/bugtraq/2002-10/0151.html
Updated Debian DEBs are listed at:
http://archives.neohapsis.com/archives/linux/debian/2002-q4/0256.html
SecurityFocus Vulnerability Information:
http://online.securityfocus.com/bid/5934
Council Site Actions:
The affected software is not in production or widespread use at any
of the council sites. They reported that no action was necessary.
=============================================================
(4) Moderate: MySimpleNews CGI Suite Multiple Vulnerabilities
Affected Products:
MySimpleNews PHP CGI Suite version 1 (runs on Unix/Linux)
Description:
The MySimpleNews PHP CGI suite allows a remote attacker to execute
arbitrary PHP code, recover the MySimpleNews administrator password,
and delete the MySimpleNews application from the web server where
it resides.
Risk: Remote system compromise.
Remote compromise of web servers running MySimpleNews, with the
privileges of the server process.
Deployment: Small.
Ease of Exploitation: Trivial.
The advisory provides examples of how to easily exploit the
vulnerabilities.
Status: Vendor has not confirmed, no patch available.
References:
Bugtraq Posting:
http://archives.neohapsis.com/archives/bugtraq/2002-10/0027.html
ISS Advisories:
http://www.iss.net/security_center/static/10296.php
http://www.iss.net/security_center/static/10298.php
http://www.iss.net/security_center/static/10299.php
SecurityFocus Vulnerability Information:
http://online.securityfocus.com/bid/5865
http://online.securityfocus.com/bid/5866
http://online.securityfocus.com/bid/5867
Council Site Actions:
The affected software is not in production or widespread use at any
of the council sites. They reported that no action was necessary.
*******************************
Exploit Codes
*******************************
(5) Windows 2000 NetDDE LOCAL/SYSTEM Privilege Escalation Exploit
Affected Products:
Microsoft Windows 2000 (all versions and service pack levels)
Name of Exploit:
GetAd.c
GetAd.exe
Description:
An attacker that gains unprivileged access to a Windows 2000 system
can leverage the Winlogon NetDDE Agent to escalate the attacker's
privileges to the LOCAL/SYSTEM level. The vulnerability principle
behind this attack well known and is not expected to be addressed
by Microsoft. This proof-of-concept exploit starts an administrative
command shell on vulnerable systems when run by an unprivileged user.
The underlying attack technique has been called "shatter", and involves
an unprivileged process passing code to a higher privileged process
for execution. Any Windows 2000 vulnerability that allows execution
of code at an unprivileged level could potentially be exploited to
allow LOCAL/SYSTEM access if the intruder crafts the attack to also
take advantage of this issue.
Security Advisory, Exploit Source and Compiled Binary:
http://getad.chat.ru/
SecurityFocus Info (includes list of vulnerable systems):
http://online.securityfocus.com/bid/5927/info
Exploit Code Posted to PacketStorm:
http://www.packetstormsecurity.nl/filedesc/GetAd.c.html
Paper about Shatter Attacks:
http://security.tombom.co.uk/shatter.html
Council Site Actions:
Most of the reporting council sites acknowledged this as a potential
problem, but not one to be overly concerned about at this time. Most
sites will monitor for when a patch is available and then determine
if the patch should be applied. Several council sites stated that
the frequently announced LOCAL/SYSTEM privilege escalation exploits
are one reason why they do not use Windows systems for sensitive
applications within their organizations.
===========================================================
About the CVA Process and Council
=================================
The CVA is produced in four phases:
Phase 1: Neohapsis (www.neohapsis.com) director of research, Jeff
Forristal, and the Neohapsis team scour all of the major vendor
web sites as well as bugtraq and other sources of new vulnerability
information and compile what they believe to be a complete list of
all new vulnerabilities and major vulnerability announcements made
during the week. The SANS Institute and Network Computing Magazine vet
the list through the major system manufacturers and jointly publish
it every week as the Security Alert Consensus. (SAC) Anyone may
subscribe to the SAC at http://www.sans.org/newlook/digests/SAC.htm
Phase 2: TippingPoint's Vicki Irwin culls the SAC list to extract the
vulnerabilities and announcements that demand immediate action. This
reduces the list from 30-50 each week down under 10. Vicki has been on
the front lines of intrusion detection and vulnerability testing for
nearly five years and her work in the field is legendary. The product
she helps update, TippingPoint's UnityOne (www.tippingpoint.com),
builds an active intrusion detection and suppression system into the
network infrastructure of its clients.
Phase 3: Very technical security managers at fifteen of the largest
user organizations in the United States each review the "immediate
action" vulnerabilities and describe what they did or did not do
to protect their organizations. Council members include banks and
other financial organizations, government agencies, universities,
major research laboratories, ISPs, health care, manufacturers,
insurance companies and a couple more. The individual members have
direct responsibility for security for their systems and networks. All
were concerned that information about their security configuration
would leak out, and agreed to serve only if their identities were
not revealed.
Phase 4: SANS compiles the responses and identifies the items on which
the Council members took or are taking action, produces the weekly CVA,
and distributes it via email to all eligible persons
**********************************************************************
Critical Vulnerability Analysis Scale Ratings
CRITICAL: Vulnerabilities are rated CRITICAL if the impact of
exploiting the vulnerability can disrupt critical or large segments of
a network (e.g. Internet facing services) or if the impact involves
a remote exploit that provides root access to the host. Typically,
for CRITICAL vulnerabilities, the vulnerability is easy or trivial to
exploit and/or exploit code is available. Critical vulnerabilities
usually involve server systems and/or high-value assets. Re-mediation
for alerts of this nature should begin within 48 hours, and in some
cases, immediately depending on the widespread use of the technology
within your organization.
HIGH: Vulnerabilities are rated HIGH if the impact of exploiting the
vulnerability is not as severe as CRITICAL alerts and the affected
software/platforms are generally not critical services within the
organization. A HIGH vulnerability may be something that effects
the client side (user hosts) and not a services such as Mail, DNS,
Web ,etc. Typically, there is a higher degree of difficulty in
exploiting HIGH vulnerabilities. Exploit code may not be available
or the attacker must entice the victim (e.g. visit a server or run an
attachment) to exploit the code. Re-mediation for alerts of this nature
should begin within five business days. If there is widespread use of
the technology at your organization or critical hosts are involved,
the re-mediation effort should begin sooner.
MODERATE: Vulnerabilities are rated MODERATE if the probable impact
of exploiting the vulnerability is considered low due to the limited
severity of the vulnerability, or there is a very high degree of
difficulty in exploiting the vulnerability, and an exploit is not
available in the wild. Moderate vulnerabilities may require to
attacker to have some type of user privileges or entice the victim in
order to exploit the problem. Re-mediation for alerts of this nature
should begin within 15 business days. If there is widespread use of
this technology at your organization or you run the affected software
on critical hosts, the re-mediation efforts should begin sooner.
******************************************************************
Subscriptions: The CVA is distributed free of charge to chief
information security officers and technical security managers of
organizations with at least 1000 systems, to GIAC certified security
professionals, and to recent alumni of SANS courses. Others may
also subscribe. Registered users may forward the CVA to others.
To change your subscription, address, or other information, visit
http://www.sans.org/sansurl and enter your SD number (from the
headers.) You will receive your personal URL via email.
Copyright 2002. No copying or forwarding allowed except by registered
subscribers. No posting is allowed to web sites.
==end==
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