OSEC

Neohapsis is currently accepting applications for employment. For more information, please visit our website www.neohapsis.com or email hr@neohapsis.com
 
From: Greg Shipley (gshipley_at_neohapsis.com)
Date: Thu Aug 15 2002 - 12:11:28 CDT

  • Messages sorted by: [ date ] [ thread ] [ subject ] [ author ]

    On Thu, 15 Aug 2002 raffael.martych.pwcglobal.com wrote:

    > I agree to some extent. But let me add the following:
    >
    > 1. If you customize the Nessus Scripts a bit (I wrote UNIX-Scripts which
    > are doing that automatically), you can issue attacks that the IDS should
    > trigger on.

    Interesting, but I'm wondering, are they real overflow attempts? All of
    them? And if not, which ones? (I haven't dug through all of the NASL
    scripts, but I seem to recall that while some of them actually go through
    exploitation steps, many do not...)

    I'm a real stickler here because I think there is a big difference between
    crafting something that the IDS "should trigger on" vs. running real
    attacks. The former strikes me as a bit of a kludge, particularly if you
    are, say, reverse-engineering snort sigs.

    > 2. Make sure you absolutely understand what the Scanner is doing. Nessus is
    > of great help, as you get the attack-scripts with it. Look at them and see
    > what they do. As soon as you can make sure that the attack is going over
    > the network, the IDS should alert.

    Er, weren't we talking about host-based IDS here? Regardless, while I
    agree it is important to know what your tool is doing (good point!), I
    think it is also important not to forgot what the goal of the test is: to
    see if the product detects someone trying to exploit a vulnerability.

    Just to add to what Andrew, Toby and you have stated, people should note
    that most of the vuln scanners these days don't actually exploit the
    service in question. They may poke at it, or they may go a step farther,
    but until they actually exploit it, IMHO, they aren't truly attacking
    anything.

    From a thread earlier this year:

    --------------------------------

    (see http://archives.neohapsis.com/archives/sf/ids/2002-q1/0081.html)

    - Scanners vs. exploit code: go with exploit code, if possible. Anyone
    using a scanner to check whether their NIDS works or not better be PRETTY
    DARN SURE that their scanner is actually ATTEMPTING to exploit those
    flaws. Most don't. Many scanners rely on banner grabbing/checking, and
    other tricks that don't "look" the same as exploit code to a NIDS. When
    possible, use real exploit code, real vulns, or packet replays of real
    exploit code (against real vulnerable machines). Real is better. :)

    --------------------------------

    I guess what I'm suggesting here is in-line with what Toby suggested, in
    that if you're going to go the scanner route, you ought to be pretty darn
    sure of what it is doing, under the hood. Most of them don't really
    attack anything, in the true sense of the term. Now, if you want to test
    your HIDS/NIDS' ability to detect PROBES, well then heck! Fire Nessus up
    and have at it! :)

    > 3. The problem of running "real" attacks is to have a good repository of
    > them. I didn't have one for my work and was left with Nessus, which turned
    > out to be quite helpful. (Do you have a collection of attacks that you
    > would share?)

    Yeah, this is the big challenge. This is also why we've stuck to the
    "old-school" method of compiling exploit code, and running them against
    vulnerable services. It is the only way to be sure, IMHO.

    For whatever its worth,

    -Greg