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From: Stephen Entwisle (seSECURITYFOCUS.COM)
Date: Mon Apr 23 2001 - 11:07:15 CDT

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    SecurityFocus.com Linux Newsletter #25
    --------------------------------------

    I. FRONT AND CENTER
         1. A Comparison of iptables Automation Tools
         2. Infectable Objects, Part Five - HTML and Other Scripts
    II. LINUX VULNERABILITY SUMMARY
         1. Trend Micro Interscan Viruswall Multiple Program Buffer ...
         2. IPTables FTP Stateful Inspection Arbitrary Filter Rule ...
         3. KFM Insecure TMP File Creation Vulnerability
    III. LINUX FOCUS LIST SUMMARY
         1. Tracking down possible Trinoo_Master hack.. (Thread)
         2. ipchains vs. iptables (Thread)
         3. Hacked box, suspect R00tkit. (Thread)
         4. Permissions (Thread)
         5. SecurityFocus.com Linux Newsletter #24 (Thread)
         6. snort snorts ONLY my eth0 (Thread)
         7. Netfilter stateful inspection doubts (Thread)
         8. Buffer overflow on Linux (Thread)
    IV. NEW PRODUCTS FOR LINUX PLATFORM
         1. M-Secure
         2. Storm Firewall
         3. Gateway Guardian
    V. NEW TOOLS FOR LINUX PLATFORMS
         1. Port Scan Attack Detector (psad)
         2. Iridium Firewall
         3. Firewall Monitor
         4. KSTAT - Kernel Security Therapy Anti-Trolls
         5. distribuNet
    VI. SUBSCRIBE/UNSUBSCRIBE INFORMATION

    I. FRONT AND CENTER
    -------------------
    1. A Comparison of iptables Automation Tools

    Over the past several years, the use of Linux as a firewall platform has
    grown significantly. Linux firewalling code has come a long way since the
    time ipfwadm was introduced in kernel 1.2. This discussion will look at IP
    firewalling code in Linux kernel and its configuration via various
    interfaces such as GUIs or scripts (written in shell scripting language,
    Perl or special configuration language). Specifically, this article will
    offer a brief overview of the means of configuring iptables, and will
    offer a brief review of some tools that have been developed to automate
    the configuration of iptables.

    http://www.securityfocus.com/focus/linux/articles/iptables.html

    2. Infectable Objects, Part Five - HTML and Other Scripts
    by by Robert Vibert

    One of the more interesting developments in the virus world has been the
    extension of viruses from compiled executable files into script files.
    There is now an expanding range of script file types that can contain
    malicious code. This article,the fifth and final in a series by
    SecurityFocus writer Robert Vibert, will offer an overview of script file
    types that can contain viral code, including batch files, Java, JavaScript
    and HTML files.

    http://www.securityfocus.com/focus/virus/articles/infobj5.html

    II. BUGTRAQ SUMMARY
    -------------------

    1. Trend Micro Interscan Viruswall Multiple Program Buffer Overflow...
    BugTraq ID: 2579
    Remote: Yes
    Date Published: 2001-04-13
    Relevant URL:
    http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/2579
    Summary:

    Interscan Viruswall is a Virus scanning software package distributed and
    maintained by Trend Micro. It is designed to scan for virus occurances in
    both incoming and outgoing traffic via SMTP, FTP, and HTTP at the gateway
    of the network.

    A combination of two problems in the Interscan Viruswall package makes it
    possible for a remote user to execute arbitrary commands as root, and
    potentially gain local access to the Viruswall system. This vulnerability
    is the manifestation of two problems, which when combined make a system
    vulnerable.

    Included with Interscan Viruswall is a web based administration interface
    called ISADMIN. This service is the CERN httpd v3.0 running on port 1812
    of the Viruswall system.

    The first problem consists of multiple programs in the cgi directory
    containing buffer overflows. It is possible to execute arbitrary commands
    through most of the programs contained in the CGI directory of the HTTP
    daemon, due to insuffient bounds checking and validation of input.

    The second problem consists of the CERN httpd insufficiently controlling
    access to programs in the CGI directory. The CERN HTTP daemon, as
    installed with the Viruswall package, runs with the privileges of root.
    The access control settings of the httpd do not allow users to directly
    execute programs ending in the .cgi suffix. However, four programs within
    the cgi directory do not end in .cgi suffixes, and may be executed
    directly through calling of the URL and file extension.

    2. IPTables FTP Stateful Inspection Arbitrary Filter Rule Insertion...
    BugTraq ID: 2602
    Remote: Yes
    Date Published: 2001-04-16
    Relevant URL:
    http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/2602
    Summary:

    The Linux kernel includes a built-in firewall implementation called
    IPTables. IPTables supports stateful inspection of several application
    protocols, one of which is FTP. The inspection is used to facilitate
    outgoing PORT connections for FTP data transfers when clients or servers
    are behind firewalls.

    Under many firewall configurations and in environments where NAT is in
    use, PORT mode data transfers normally cannot be used.

    Some firewalls support stateful inspection of FTP traffic, which can allow
    the firewall to dynamically open and map ports for FTP data transfers.
    These firewalls permit the use of PORT mode FTP. In the Linux IPTables
    implementation, filtering rules for FTP PORT mode data are stored in the
    table of 'RELATED' connections, temporarily permitting the traffic through
    the firewall.

    The IPTables module used to inspect FTP data and interpret PORT requests
    contains a vulnerability which may allow a remote attacker to insert
    malicious rules into the firewall's table of related connections.

    The PORT command accepts two basic parameters, the IP address and TCP port
    of the destination host. When a PORT command is issued, the server makes
    a connection to the destination host on that port and transmits the data.
    To prevent malicious users from utilizing this mechanism to proxy data
    transfers to arbitrary hosts (ftp bounce attack), most FTP servers compare
    the destination IP address in the PORT command to the address of the
    client. If they do not match, the command is rejected and typically
    logged. The stateful-inspection module also attempts to detect this.

    When a PORT command containing an IP address which differs from the
    client's is processed, the occurrence is caught. Despite being detected,
    the condition is handled erroneously causing an entry for the PORT
    connection to be inserted into the table of 'RELATED' connections. This
    temporarily permits traffic through the firewall from the FTP server to
    the destination included in the PORT command.

    The following section of source code contains the offending operation in
    the stateful-inspection module.

    The 'if' condition below determines whether the IP address in the PORT
    command matches the client's or not.

            /* Update the ftp info */
            LOCK_BH(&ip_ftp_lock);
            if (htonl((array[0] << 24) | (array[1] << 16) | (array[2] << 8) |
    array[3])
                == ct->tuplehash[dir].tuple.src.ip) {
                    info->is_ftp = 1;
                    info->seq = ntohl(tcph->seq) + matchoff;
                    info->len = matchlen;
                    info->ftptype = dir;
                    info->port = array[4] << 8 | array[5];
            } else {
                    /* Enrico Scholz's passive FTP to partially RNAT'd ftp
                       server: it really wants us to connect to a
                       different IP address. Simply don't record it for
                       NAT. */
                    DEBUGP("conntrack_ftp: NOT RECORDING: %u,%u,%u,%u !=
    %u.%u.%u.%u\n",
                           array[0], array[1], array[2], array[3],
                           NIPQUAD(ct->tuplehash[dir].tuple.src.ip));
            } The problem lies in the 'else' block, which executes if the
    addresses do not match. After executing, it does not return or otherwise
    stop the processing of the PORT command. The module continues to function
    as though the PORT command is valid, creating an entry in the 'RELATED'
    connections table.

    Furthermore, clients do not need to authenticate to exploit this
    vulnerability. Anyone who can reach the service may be able to cause this
    behaviour, including 'internal' clients.

    If exploited successfully, an attacker can create a condition where the
    FTP server can establish connections to arbitrary hosts on any port
    bypassing IPTables filtering rules.

    This could be used by an attacker to gain access to internal, protected
    hosts from the FTP server if it is compromised by an attacker. In
    addition, an attacker on an internal network could use this vulnerability
    to access external hosts (which they do not normally have access to)
    through the FTP server.

    3. KFM Insecure TMP File Creation Vulnerability
    BugTraq ID: 2629
    Remote: No
    Date Published: 2001-04-18
    Relevant URL:
    http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/2629
    Summary:

    KFM is the KDE File Manager, included with version 1 of the KDE base
    package in most Linux installations. KFM is designed as a graphical,
    easily navigated interface to the Linux Filesystem.

    A problem in the KFM package could make it possible for local users to
    overwrite any file owned by a user of KFM. This is due to insufficient
    checking of previously existing temporary files and directories by the KFM
    package.

    Upon execution, KFM creates a temporary directory in which to cache
    content. This temporary directory is created using a name consisting of
    kfm-cache-<USER ID>. An example would be a user with an id of 1000. The
    directory would be created using the name kfm-cache-1000. This directory
    usually caches a set of predictable files.

    KFM does not safely check for the existance of this directory prior to
    using it, and upon needing to use one of the predicted files in the
    directory, will attempt to place output into the previously made symbolic
    link, thus overwriting the contents of the linked file, resulting in data
    corruption or loss of data entirely.

    III. LINUX FOCUS LIST SUMMARY
    ---------------------------------

    1. Tracking down possible Trinoo_Master hack.. (Thread)
    Relevant URL:

    wwonline.com">http://www.securityfocus.com/frames/index.html?content=%2ftemplates%2farchive.pike%3flist%3d91%26date%3d2001-04-20%26thread%3d01a701c0c8c7$6d7e6160$363e52d1wwonline.com

    2. ipchains vs. iptables (Thread)
    Relevant URL:

    http://www.securityfocus.com/frames/index.html?content=%2ftemplates%2farchive.pike%3flist%3d91%26date%3d2001-04-20%26thread%3d010419102pfrisch

    3. Hacked box, suspect R00tkit. (Thread)
    Relevant URL:

    http://www.securityfocus.com/frames/index.html?content=%2ftemplates%2farchive.pike%3flist%3d91%26date%3d2001-04-20%26thread%3d3ADD9008.infront.co.uk

    4. Permissions (Thread)
    Relevant URL:

    http://www.securityfocus.com/frames/index.html?content=%2ftemplates%2farchive.pike%3flist%3d91%26date%3d2001-04-20%26thread%3d200104161babylon5.babcom.com

    5. SecurityFocus.com Linux Newsletter #24 (Thread)
    Relevant URL:

    http://www.securityfocus.com/frames/index.html?content=%2ftemplates%2farchive.pike%3flist%3d91%26date%3d2001-04-20%26thread%3dPine.GSO.mail

    6. snort snorts ONLY my eth0 (Thread)
    Relevant URL:

    http://www.securityfocus.com/frames/index.html?content=%2ftemplates%2farchive.pike%3flist%3d91%26date%3d2001-04-20%26thread%3d200104141tigerteam.net

    7. Netfilter stateful inspection doubts (Thread)
    Relevant URL:

    http://www.securityfocus.com/frames/index.html?content=%2ftemplates%2farchive.pike%3flist%3d91%26date%3d2001-04-20%26thread%3d3AD875F4.prodigy.net.mx

    8. Buffer overflow on Linux (Thread)
    Relevant URL:

    http://www.securityfocus.com/frames/index.html?content=%2ftemplates%2farchive.pike%3flist%3d91%26date%3d2001-04-20%26thread%3dPine.LNX.spice.eahd.or.ug

    IV.NEW PRODUCTS FOR LINUX PLATFORMS
    ----------------------------------------

    1. M-Secure
    by MessagingDirect
    Platforms: AIX, IRIX, Linux and Solaris
    Relevant URL:
    http://www.securityfocus.com/products/1127
    Summary:

    M-Secure is MessagingDirect's secure pipeline for the creation, sending
    and receiving of digitally signed and encrypted documents. The
    Extranet-tuned strongbox can authenticate valid users of the Extranet, no
    matter where they are. M-Secure offers end-to-end security that is
    location independent and is as simple to use as an ATM. It is the ultimate
    tool for high-security networks ready to step out of the office and into
    the world - at a fraction of the complexity and cost of current solutions.

    2. Storm Firewall
    by Stormix Technologies
    Platforms: Linux
    Relevant URL:
    http://www.securityfocus.com/products/1332
    Summary:

    The Storm Firewall is a stable, easy-to-use security solution for your
    home or business computers.

    The Storm Firewall graphical user interface provides:
    -Firewall Setup Wizard lets anyone setup a firewall quickly.
    -Simple Options builds on top of the base provided by the Wizard, allowing
    for further customization.
    -Advanced Setup gives you the flexibilty to edit rules at the chain level,
    so you can design your own firewall.
    -Log Viewer allows you to view firewall activity, and filter logs by IP
    address or chain.

    3. Gateway Guardian
    by NetMaster Networking Solutions, Inc.
    Platforms: Linux
    Relevant URL:
    http://www.securityfocus.com/products/1298
    Summary:

    Developed with NetMaster's own Linux distribution tailored specifically
    for firewall applications, Gateway Guardian is a very flexible, high-end
    firewall that takes a revolutionary approach to allowing a company to use
    a lower-end PC as their Internet gateway. Running on a PC that is not the
    Internet gateway, Gateway Guardian uses a pure Java application to
    preconfigure hardware, Internet provider settings, and firewall rules
    through a wizard like format. When the information has been entered, the
    Java application writes an entire Linux operating system and the custom
    firewall configuration onto a 3-1/4" floppy diskette.

    V.NEW TOOLS FOR LINUX PLATFORMS
    ------------------------------------

    1. Port Scan Attack Detector (psad)
    by Michael Rash <mbrcipherdyne.com>
    Platforms: Linux
    Relevant URL:
    http://www.securityfocus.com/tools/2006
    Summary:

    Port Scan Attack Detector (psad) is a program written in Perl that is
    designed to work with Linux firewalling code (iptables in the 2.4.x
    kernels, and ipchains in the 2.2.x kernels) to detect port scans. It
    features a set of highly configurable danger thresholds (with sensible
    defaults provided), verbose alert messages that include the source,
    destination, scanned port range, begin and end times, TCP flags and
    corresponding nmap options (Linux 2.4.x kernels only), email alerting, and
    automatic blocking of offending IP addresses via dynamic configuration of
    ipchains/iptables firewall rulesets. In addition, for the 2.4.x kernels
    psad incorporates many of the TCP signatures included in Snort to detect
    highly suspect scans for various backdoor programs (e.g. EvilFTP,
    GirlFriend, SubSeven), DDoS tools (mstream, shaft), and advanced port
    scans (syn, fin, Xmas) which are easily leveraged against a machine via
    nmap.

    2. Iridium Firewall
    by Ryan Edwards
    Platforms: Linux
    Relevant URL:
    http://www.securityfocus.com/tools/1948
    Summary:

    Iridium Firewall is an ipchains-based Linux 2.2 packet-filtering firewall
    designed for use on a gateway server protecting an internal LAN of
    masqueraded devices. It provides protection from many (I won't say all)
    forms of Denial of Service attacks, IP Spoofing, Stuffed Routing, Stuffed
    Masquerading, SYN Cookie attacks, damaged or hostile ICMP packets, and
    packet fragmentation among others. It protects from attacks on several
    well known Trojan Horse and illegal ports as well as attempted connections
    from bogus, reserved or illegal IP addresses.

    3. Firewall Monitor
    by Gianni Tedesco, scaramangabarrysworld.com
    Platforms: Linux
    Relevant URL:
    http://www.securityfocus.com/tools/1883
    Summary:

    fwmon is a firewall monitor for Linux. It integrates with ipchains to give
    you realtime notification of firewall events. It has fairly customizable
    output, allowing you to display a packet summary, hex, and ascii data
    dumps to stdout, a logfile, or tcpdump-style capture files. It also boasts
    some simple security features such as the ability to chroot itself, and
    operate in a non-root environment.

    4. KSTAT - Kernel Security Therapy Anti-Trolls
    by S0ftproject2000 Team <staffs0ftpj.org>
    Platforms: Linux
    Relevant URL:
    http://www.securityfocus.com/tools/1995
    Summary:

    Tool useful to find an attacker in your system by a direct analysis of the
    kernel through /dev/kmem and bypassing the hiding techniques of the
    intruder (kernel static recompilation/use of LKMs). Kstat can find the
    syscalls which were modified by a LKM, list the linked LKMs, query one or
    all the network interfaces of the system, list all the processes and much
    more.

    5. distribuNet
    by Arshan Dabirsiaghi
    Platforms: Linux
    Relevant URL:
    http://www.securityfocus.com/tools/1997
    Summary:

    distribuNet is a mid-level statically linked C library for cross-platform
    distributed networking applications. The library operates almost exactly
    like th Berkeley socket libraries that it wraps. The library has been
    compiled and tested on Linux 2.2 and Linux 2.0 with g++. All programs
    built with the library must use g++ as well, since it takes advantage of
    some of the C++ gcc modules.

    VI. SUBSCRIBE/UNSUBSCRIBE INFORMATION
    -------------------------------------

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      Send an e-mail message to LISTSERVSECURITYFOCUS.COM with a message body
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