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From: Patrick S. Harper (patrickinternetsecurityguru.com)
Date: Thu Aug 16 2001 - 10:45:21 CDT

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    I have learned this from both experience and lots of reading, mix that
    with good administrative practices and you have a fairly secure system.
    One of the basics to me is that if you are not using it remove it. If
    there is a mapping in IIS that is not and will never be relevant to your
    content get rid of it. I find servers all the time that still have .htr
    vulnerabilities. I use it to look at there global.asa and half the time
    they have an administrative account referenced in it. I don't know anyone
    who is allowing passwords to be changed from a live web server (this is
    what the .htr is used for) I have scripted out the most relevant parts of
    the IIS checklist from Microsoft
    (http://www.microsoft.com/technet/treeview/default.asp?url=/technet/itsolu
    tions/security/tools/iis5chk.asp for IIS 5 and
    http://www.microsoft.com/technet/treeview/default.asp?url=/technet/itsolut
    ions/security/tools/iischk.asp for IIS 4)I never use default installation
    locations for anything, and I choose custom install for everything and
    remove unneeded components

    Hope this has helped.

    Also I like these, even though it is funny that they came from Microsoft
    http://www.microsoft.com/technet/treeview/default.asp?url=/technet/columns
    /security/10imlaws.asp

    > -----Original Message-----
    > From: Andrew Langton [mailto:andrew.langtonBabcockBrown.com]
    > Sent: Thursday, August 16, 2001 9:27 AM
    > To: 'patrickinternetsecurityguru.com';
    > security-basicssecurityfocus.com; focus-mssecurityfocus.com
    > Subject: RE: Properly securing IIS (Was: Accessing mail from the web)
    >
    >
    > So is this all documented somewhere, or have you learnt all this by
    > experience? Or both? ;)
    >
    > > -----Original Message-----
    > > From: Patrick S. Harper [mailto:patrickinternetsecurityguru.com]
    > > Sent: Thursday, August 16, 2001 6:24 AM
    > > To: Andrew Langton; 'Frank Knobbe'; security-basicssecurityfocus.com;
    > > focus-mssecurityfocus.com
    > > Subject: RE: Accessing mail from the web
    > >
    > >
    > > My IIS systems were also not affected by code red, and I did
    > > not need to
    > > apply the patch. I simply removed the .ida mapping,
    > > unregistered the DLL
    > > and then renamed it. If I had anything running index server
    > > I would have
    > > used the patch.
    > >
    > > > -----Original Message-----
    > > > From: Andrew Langton [mailto:andrew.langtonBabcockBrown.com]
    > > > Sent: Wednesday, August 15, 2001 11:58 PM
    > > > To: 'Frank Knobbe'; security-basicssecurityfocus.com;
    > > > focus-mssecurityfocus.com
    > > > Subject: RE: Accessing mail from the web
    > > >
    > > >
    > > > So how did you avoid the Code Red worms? The way I
    > > understand it, they
    > > > worked by utilising the .ida vulnerability - that works
    > > over port 80.
    > > >
    > > > > -----Original Message-----
    > > > > From: Frank Knobbe [mailto:FKnobbeKnobbeITS.com]
    > > > > Sent: Wednesday, August 15, 2001 9:59 AM
    > > > > To: 'Andrew Langton'; 'RH'; security-basicssecurityfocus.com;
    > > > > focus-mssecurityfocus.com
    > > > > Subject: RE: Accessing mail from the web
    > > > >
    > > > >
    > > > > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
    > > > > Hash: SHA1
    > > > >
    > > > > > -----Original Message-----
    > > > > > From: Andrew Langton [mailto:andrew.langtonBabcockBrown.com]
    > > > > > Sent: Tuesday, August 14, 2001 5:16 PM
    > > > > >
    > > > > > Therein lies the problem.... we don't really have the
    > > > > > resources to put into
    > > > > > constantly patching both Windows and IIS if the servers are
    > > > > > exposed. Our
    > > > > > aim is to make the system as unexposed as possible.
    > > > >
    > > > > Andrew,
    > > > >
    > > > > you need to get used to the fact that HAVE to accept a
    > > certain risk
    > > > > level. If you want to play it bullet-proof and 100% safe, then you
    > > > > need to keep the box disconnected from the network.
    > > > >
    > > > > If the system is properly hardened in the beginning and configured
    > > > > well, you don't have to put every patch on it. I had
    > > systems (of my
    > > > > own and client systems) that were not patched against Code Red.
    > > > > However, they were not vulnerable because the systems were setup
    > > > > properly in the beginning (remove stuff, incl. IIS mappings, that
    > > > > aren't needed; correctly configured firewall; properly hardened
    > > > > system; etc)
    > > > >
    > > > > A web server for OWA, that accesses an Exchange server on
    > > a different
    > > > > box, can be slimmed and hardened quite well. I see you
    > > reaction as a
    > > > > fear of the unknown. I suggest you review a couple NT hardening
    > > > > guides and built the machine while repeating the lines "I
    > > will remove
    > > > > what I don't need, I will remove...".
    > > > >
    > > > > Again, if the system is properly setup, you don't need to
    > > have a lot
    > > > > of resources babysitting that box.
    > > > >
    > > > > Regards,
    > > > > Frank
    > > > >
    > > > >
    > > > >
    > > > > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
    > > > > Version: PGP Personal Privacy 6.5.8
    > > > > Comment: PGP or S/MIME encrypted email preferred.
    > > > >
    > > > > iQA/AwUBO3qqR5ytSsEygtEFEQIA8QCeN36Zm8iAfKSCWQQXRZCVX3+gAmoAn2Gf
    > > > > omTFhptWiRqZAKTA8RxNagyO
    > > > > =LjG9
    > > > > -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
    > > > >
    > > >
    > > >
    > > >
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