OSEC

Neohapsis is currently accepting applications for employment. For more information, please visit our website www.neohapsis.com or email hr@neohapsis.com
 
From: Alexandre Freire (afreiremodulo.com.br)
Date: Tue Oct 30 2001 - 02:02:53 CST

  • Messages sorted by: [ date ] [ thread ] [ subject ] [ author ]

    Hello all ;

    I have had a problem in one of the on the companies I'm providing
    consulting. Two of the servers are running WIndows NT 4.0 and someone has
    changed the contents of cache data. For a while (as the time we spent to
    discover the problem), the www was changed to another web site.

    Only the secondary DNS Server was affected. The Primary one was not changed.
    I was trying to discover what could be happened when I realized that threre
    is a vulnerability on the Microsoft DNS Servers that could led to Cache
    Corruption.

    I've found some documents that explains the vulnerability and all of them
    instructs the creation of the following registry key to avoid the attack ;

    HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\System\CurrentControlSet\Services\DNS\Parameters

    Value Name: SecureResponses
    Data Type: REG_DWORD
    Value: 1 (To eliminate non-secure data)

    Are there any additional procedures I can do in order to avoid this kind of
    attack ? The Server is running SP6a and I've applied the Microsoft Network
    Security Hotfix Checker 3.2 in order to look for post-SP6a fixes I could
    apply to fix the DNS problem and It did not return any hotfix regarding this
    issue.

    Thanks for attention.
    Regards

    Alex.

    The following is a copy of the Incident Note published on CERT :

    CERT® Incident Note IN-2001-11
    Cache Corruption on Microsoft DNS Servers

    Systems Affected
    Microsoft Windows NT 4.0 and Windows 2000 systems running Microsoft DNS
    Server

    I - Overview
    The CERT/CC has received reports from sites experiencing cache corruption on
    systems running Microsoft DNS Server. The default configuration of this
    software allows data from malicious or incorrectly configured servers to be
    cached in the DNS server. This corruption can result in erronous DNS
    information later being returned to any clients which use this server.

    II. - Description
    In the default configuration, Microsoft DNS server will accept bogus glue
    records from non-delegated servers. These bogus records will be added to the
    cache when a client attempts to resolve a particular hostname served by a
    malicious or incorrectly configured DNS server. The client can be coerced to
    request such a hostname as a result of an otherwise non-malicious piece of
    HTML email (such as spam) or in banner advertisements on websites, to give
    some examples.
    Based on information contained in reports of this activity, there are sites
    actively engaged in this deceptive DNS resolution. These reports indicate
    that malicious DNS servers are providing bogus glue records for the generic
    top-level domain servers (gtld-servers.net) potentially resulting in
    erroneous results (e.g., failed resolution or redirection) for any DNS
    request.

    More information about the problem can be found at
    VU#109475 - Microsoft Windows NT and 2000 Domain Name Servers allow
    non-authoritative RRs to be cached by default
    http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/109475

    Secure server cache against names pollution
    http://www.microsoft.com/WINDOWS2000/en/server/help/sag_DNS_pro_SecureCacheP
    ollutedNames.htm

    How to Prevent DNS Cache Pollution (Q241352)
    http://support.microsoft.com/support/kb/articles/Q241/3/52.ASP
    http://msdn.microsoft.com/library/en-us/regentry/46753.asp

    Alex Freire, GCFW - Modulo Security Solutions
    Rio de Janeiro - RJ - Brazil.