OSEC

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From: Evan Mann (emannquestinc.org)
Date: Mon Jan 07 2002 - 10:08:44 CST

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    I've seen 2 general securing IIS/OWA topics (that I recall) come through
    this group in the past 9 months or so, and none of the solutions people came
    up with were very easy to implement or necessarily cost IMHO. They also
    were not very realistic (to me at least) for a very small scale OWA
    implementation. I only have about a dozen people, if not less, who use OWA
    from their home computers a few times a week.

    For me, the only ultimate security solution comes down to not using OWA.
    This eliminates OWA based exploits and IIS/system level based exploit caused
    by IIS. This would require me to get users going on dial-ups,VPNs, or
    POP3/IMAP, all which have tradeoffs.

    -----Original Message-----
    From: Turner, Keith [mailto:TurnerLtea-emh1.army.mil]
    Sent: Monday, January 07, 2002 11:01 AM
    To: 'Evan Mann'; 'focus-mssecurityfocus.com'
    Subject: RE: Securing OWA w/SSL on IIS5.0

     There's one significant issue which doesn't get touched on very often
    during these OWA security debates. Most people seem to be worried about
    securing the email and the user's credentials. What about a new IIS buffer
    overflow attack which would allow someone to gain system level access on a
    domain member server behind your firewall through an encrypted protocol?
      Your IDS system is useless because you are using SSL. It doesn't matter
    that you are up to date on the patches because it's a newly discovered
    vulnerability. How long does it take for the rest of your network to fall
    victim through the compromised IIS server?
     Unfortunately, I don't have any good OWA recommendations - maybe someone
    else does. What we're currently looking at is using a web<->imap gateway
    program which would be on a server outside the firewall and allowing only
    IMAP traffic from that server through the firewall. The clients would
    access the IMAP<->web gateway server using SSL and you can enable IMAP over
    SSL as well (for the hop between the gateway and the firewall/IMAP server).

    Keith

    -----Original Message-----
    From: Evan Mann [mailto:emannquestinc.org]
    Sent: Thursday, January 03, 2002 11:10 AM
    To: 'focus-mssecurityfocus.com'
    Subject: Securing OWA w/SSL on IIS5.0

    I would like someone to tell me if what I did is the appropriate way to
    secure my OWA connections. The main goal was to secure the password
    exchange as my OWA server is firm external use and I have to allow
    anon/basic text auth for it. The OWA server itself sits behind my firewall
    and is accessed via an HTTP proxy from external to internal. SSL on port 443
    also NATs the same way.

    In any event, I found all the appropriate MS KB articles on setting up a CA
    and securing an IIS5.0 website with SSL. It was pretty basic. Installed
    the CA. Setup my OWA website with a certificate. Not much else needed to
    be done according to the KB articles. Now whenever I hit the site the
    typical IE popup about accepting a certificate pops up and I accept it and
    IE shows the page as being secured, and all further OWA pages.

    On my test computer, I also installed the certificated for the CA into my
    trusted certificates list. I do not plan to have all my users of OWA do
    this at this time, is this a good or bad idea?

    I am "ignorning client certificates" on my particular website, mainly
    because I am clueless as to how to configure these, and when I use "accept
    client certificates", I get an additional certificate box where I am to
    select a certificate, but none are in a list to select.

    Am I at the point where I'm actually encrypting the password exchange and
    all other data sent over OWA, or do I have a false sene of security?

    Evan Mann