OSEC

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From: Jim Harrison (SPG) (jmharr_at_microsoft.com)
Date: Mon Jan 13 2003 - 15:41:15 CST

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    That's a very similar scenario, IMHO.
    The point they're trying to make is that if data protection is your
    biggest concern, then RPC encryption offers the same protection level as
    a VPN tunnel.
    My earlier point was, RPC uses known interfaces (multiple), which are
    popular targets. Encrypting the data prevents some forms of snooping,
    but it doesn't protect the machine interfaces that provide this
    communication.
    If you block access to them (via tunneling, for instance) and
    RPC-encrypt them, you've just increased your jerk-resistance that much
    more.
    Of course, there may be times when you have to choose one over the
    other.
    In that case, I'd choose VPN.

    * Jim Harrison
    MCP(NT4/2K), A+, Network+
    Security Business Unit (ISAQFE)

    The burden of proof is not satisfied by a lack of evidence to the
    contrary..

    -----Original Message-----
    From: Keith Smith [mailto:ksmithfiresnacks.com]
    Sent: Monday, January 13, 2003 07:53
    To: focus-mssecurityfocus.com
    Subject: RE: AD replication over WAN

    I have a similar question, though in application to Outlook 2002 clients
    accessing an exchange server across the Internet. Microsoft claims that
    with OL2002, clients don't need to employ a VPN across the internet, as
    the RPC is all encrypted.

    Would a VPN also be recommended in this instance given the observations
    below?

    Thanks
    Keith

    -----Original Message-----
    From: Jim Harrison (SPG) [mailto:jmharrmicrosoft.com]
    Sent: Sunday January 12, 2003 9:43 PM
    To: Valentine M. Smith; focus-mssecurityfocus.com
    Subject: RE: AD replication over WAN

    Given that the replication path (port/protocol) is well-defined and
    generally understood, it also makes sense that they could also provide a
    "door" to your AD controllers for those who wish to do you harm for no
    apparent reason.
     
    With that in mind, it seems clear to me that a site-to-site VPN is not
    only preferable, it's mandatory.
     
    * Jim Harrison <mailto:jmharrmicrosoft.com>
    MCP(NT4/2K), A+, Network+
    Security Business Unit (ISA)

    ________________________________

    From: Valentine M. Smith [mailto:vmsmithgrokking.org]
    Sent: Thu 1/9/2003 06:21
    To: focus-mssecurityfocus.com
    Subject: AD replication over WAN
             

    Hi,

    I'm looking for some feedback from the community regarding the transfer
    of AD traffic over a public WAN.

    The basic plan is this:

    Single Win 2000 domain spread over two sites in different cities. Each
    site has perimeter NAT device and are obscuring internal subnets with IP
    addresses provided by a single ISP. No internetwork VPN planned. DNS is
    AD-integrated at both sites. Both DCs are patched to SP3.

    The MS documentation I've consulted indicates that AD replication, and
    by extension, DNS zone information that is AD-integrated is
    automatically encrypted.

    My question: if the data is already encrypted and is passing only across
    a single ISP's network, should one be bothering with a router-router VPN
    tunnel for this traffic? IOW, would setting up such a tunnel for this
    data be redundant/unnecessary or am I missing something important here?
    Would anyone care to comment on the relative safety of AD encryption
    out-of-the-box?

    Thanks in advance for any feedback,

    VS