Assuming an attacker was able to duplicate the SoftID token on their Palm,
then they don't have to be that accurate about the time difference between
the original Palm and their duplicate. The acceptable token values are
from a window of acceptible values and I think it's +/- 10 values for a
SoftID token. That means the attacker's Palm could be +/- 10 minutes from
the original.

As always, it is imperative that the owner of the authenticator is
protective of their token, be it a standalone device (standard token) or
software-based solution. Back to training our users properly I guess.

-----Original Message-----
From: Penetration Testers [mailto:PEN-TESTSECURITYFOCUS.COM]On Behalf
Of Ng, Kenneth (US)
Sent: 26 January 2001 15:29
To: PEN-TESTSECURITYFOCUS.COM
Subject: Re: [PEN-TEST] Palm Pilot Security

SecurID authentication depends on two components, what you have and what
you
know. To defeat a hardware token you must generate the proper code at the
proper time, and you must know the PIN that the person has chosen. PINs
are
from 3 to 8 character alpha numerics, but I bet most people choose 4 digit
numbers to match their ATM card.

As far as getting information from a PALM pilot, I'd imagine that you
would
have to borrow the pilot twice. The first time put in a program to copy
the
PIN. The second time to get the PIN and download the seed information.
Technically you should also get the time on the pilot with respect to UTC,
but most equipment should be within a minute or two of the real time.
Stealing a pilot often isn't hard. Borrowing one that is returned without
the person noticing is usually harder. I have no idea how long it would
take to break in and add a PIN grabbing program.

Summary: is it an increased risk? Yes. Is it significant? Well, depends
on how well the end user guards his pilot. I keep mine in my pocket
except
at home. I never leave it on my desk at work.

-----Original Message-----
From: Crist Clark [mailto:crist.clarkGLOBALSTAR.COM]
Sent: Thursday, January 25, 2001 7:27 PM
To: PEN-TESTSECURITYFOCUS.COM
Subject: Re: [PEN-TEST] Palm Pilot Security

Mike Ahern wrote:

[snip]

> Anybody aware of methods to hack past the password
> protection on the Palm? I assume that like anything
> else, physical access equals potential for 100% system
> compromise. Anyone aware of any RSA/Security Dynamics
> soft token security issues on the Palm Pilot?

I believe what is important in this case is not necessarily preventing
people from breaking the password protection, but rather being able
to detect it.

Most SecurID tokens have no access control. It's just a little device
with a number on the screen. If the user loses it or it is stolen, you
deactivate access for the old one and give him a new one. It is assumed
it cannot be cloned without the owner noticing. Even if one can crack it
open to get the secret key out, the owner should be able to tell the
device was tampered with.

For a PDA with soft tolken software, the problem is that it may be
possible for an attacker to clone the tolken without the owner knowing.
Like you say, one assumes physical access equals compromise. If someone
loses her PDA, you cancel access for her tolken. Easy call. The challenge
in arrises when a tolken is stolen, but the physical device is not. It
is not required that the password protection on the PDA be extremely
strong or difficult to defeat _PROVIDED_ you can tell when this has
occurred.

That said, I really do not know how easy or difficult it is to compromise
a PDA and then cover your tracks. I just wanted to point out that if some
people point to general information about PDA security, this should
probably
be the criteria used to evaluate their security standards when serving as
a soft tolken device: Not the ability to repell attack, but the ability
to tell if an attack has occurred.

--
Crist J. Clark                                Network Security Engineer
crist.clarkglobalstar.com                    Globalstar, L.P.
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