OSEC

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From: Jeff Williams _at_ Aspect (_at_)
Date: Tue Dec 03 2002 - 19:56:30 CST

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    The underlying question here is -- how do you find the most serious
    holes for the least money?

    There are certain problems (concurrency, Easter eggs, design flaws) that
    are extremely difficult to find with penetration testing. Likewise,
    there are many problems that are invisible when sifting through a
    mountain of code.

    I believe there is a strong argument that the most cost-effective
    approach is to do BOTH. Doesn't that cost twice as much? No -- we've
    found that reviews that include both penetration testing and code
    review:

        - take about the same amount of time
        - provide a much better completeness argument
        - find more serious problems
        - provide better information to developers about how to fix it

    The problem is building a team that is skilled in both security and web
    app development. To be effective, they need to be able to read and
    understand the code quickly. I wouldn't want a building inspector who
    couldn't read the blueprints.

    So, in my opinion, penetration testing alone is not going to provide the
    best bang for your buck. Code review is way too easy and productive to
    leave out of your balanced security breakfast.

    --Jeff

    Jeff Williams
    Aspect Security, Inc.
    www.aspectsecurity.com

    ----- Original Message -----
    From: Kevin Spett
    To: danidsec.com ; glyn.geoghegancorsaire.com ;
    securityarchitecthush.com
    Cc: webappsecsecurityfocus.com
    Sent: Tuesday, December 03, 2002 5:27 PM
    Subject: Re: WebAppSec Training Courses in UK

    I've got a couple of quick reactions here... and this isn't a rebuttal
    or a
    disagreement with what Security Architect wrote, it's some contextual
    information that should be considered along with it.

    White box auditing is very, very, very expensive. Normal IT support
    guys
    often charge $50 or more an hour these days. A qualified security
    source
    code auditor can charge four times that. Plus expenses.

    But that's not all. There's more than just source code. You've got to
    check the web server for misconfiguration issues. And the web
    application
    server. And how about the database server?

    Having a professional go through all of these steps is a remarkably
    expensive procedure. Regardless of whether companies *should* budget
    for
    that kind of top-to-bottom thorough inspection, most (and by most I mean
    nearly every last one of them) don't. So let's say you've got a $20k
    budget
    to make a large web application infastructure as secure as possible.

    For that money, a skilled pen-test team can probably do more good than a
    source code auditor. Two and a half work weeks (using $200/hour and
    $20k
    budget) isn't a whole lot to go through a large codebase, not to mention
    securing multiple server configurations. An experienced pen-test team
    with
    good automated black box testing tools will probably be able to find
    most of
    the serious issues that most hackers would go after in your regular 40
    hour
    pen test. (Yes, if all they do is run ISS Scanner or Nessus and give
    you a
    report warning about parameter tampering, you get screwed.)

    Of course, the best solution is to set up solid security policies and
    requirements for coding, configuration, administration, user management,
    etc. in the beginning, but most people don't have that luxury. So
    you've
    got to compromise. If you can pay for it, a complete security-conscious
    overhaul in policy and implementation is a great idea, as is a complete
    manual source code and configuration audit. But in a more practical
    situation where you've already got something built, maybe even deployed,
    and
    all of a sudden a manager says 'Hey! Make sure it's secure!' , you may
    be
    able to get more bang for your buck with a quality pen-test team.

    Kevin Spett
    SPI Labs
    http://www.spidynamics.com/

    ----- Original Message -----
    From: <securityarchitecthush.com>
    To: <danidsec.com>; <glyn.geoghegancorsaire.com>
    Cc: <webappsecsecurityfocus.com>
    Sent: Tuesday, December 03, 2002 2:08 PM
    Subject: RE: WebAppSec Training Courses in UK

    >
    > With respect I think your description of security assessment training
    is
    woefully inadequate in todays world. Penetration testing is a snapshot
    at
    best and a time trial at worst. Having ran some teams for some well
    known
    consulting companies in the past I know all to well the business model
    and
    why its pushed so hard by them. Now working in corporate America I also
    see
    why we the clients (yeah we as in my company and others at like minded
    user
    groups who surprisingly do talk) are getting very frustrated with some
    security consulting companies and training companies.
    >
    > <rant>
    > Firstly there is little accountability. Its perceived as an art and
    not a
    science and therefore you really have little confidence that all of the
    things that should have been tested were. Secondly with 78% of attacks
    being
    from insiders (see FBI reports) , looking at the hard crunchy outside is
    of
    little value. Too many companies reports read “High Vulnerability –
    Parameter tampering”. After the sticker shock you read between the lines
    and
    find out you can change the page color and they have made an incredible
    leap
    of faith from that to saying you “may” be able to login in with another
    users username. An indicator of parameter tampering in one place can
    lead to
    it in another. It’s the consulting fluff syndrome. You’ve all heard it
    before I am sure. “These sessionID’s don’t look random”. Well test the
    randomness if you have a math degree! If not look for the source of
    randomness and if /urandom is used then call it out.
    > </rant>
    >
    > Someone once used a great analogy. If you’re testing for cancer would
    you
    take someone’s temperature? Would you look at their eyeballs? Hell No!
    Get
    them on the cat scan machine. Even if the eyeballs are dilated and you
    can
    tell theyre ill, you still need to locate the problem (offending code)
    to
    treat it.
    >
    > One of the things I liked when I spoke to the OWASP testing people was
    how
    they are going to cover what I think should be included in a web
    application
    security testing methodology. In a structured meaningful test you need
    to
    firstly sit down and understand the security requirements. How can you
    ever
    say there is a problem unless you know the requirements and how it
    should
    be? Secondly you need to understand the application architecture. That’s
    an
    assessment in itself! How are people using JNDI, LDAP JMS <insert
    architecture component of choice here>. People are finally realizing
    that
    XSS is easily cured with a proper architecture;-) You don’t fix it
    tactically, you fix it strategically.
    >
    > Then there is a technical assessment which is where most people think
    the
    pen test comes in. But think of this. My requirements have shown that
    sessions timeout after 20 mins and my architecture review shows I use
    the
    servlet container config (server.xml) to do it and the controller
    servlet to
    enforce it. I can sit there with a perl script and make a request every
    21
    mins to each url (dumb in my opinion) or I can parse web.xml and
    server.xml
    for the config. Ones a much more effective way to technically test the
    requirements have been implemented IMHO. A pen test may have a place in
    ensuring that stuffs functioning as it should be that’s where it belongs
    again IMHO, flamesOff(security, architect).
    >
    > And then there’s a security source code review, a web application
    security
    management review (what happens when it goes down, who reviews logs,
    what
    policy exists to manage the security of the application).
    >
    > Web application security assessment is far more than a pen test. They
    are
    prevalent because consulting companies can pull the wool of clients eyes
    with buzz words and hacker speak, not to mention the business model that
    works well for the consulting companies. If you pay 40K for a hit and
    run
    that’s good business. But if you fix the first hole and have to pay $40K
    for
    the next then its not economical and the client will soon feel ripped
    of.
    >
    > And why does this relate to training? Well people IMHO need to be
    trained
    that web application security assessment consists of many things not
    just
    how to own a web server in 20 mins or how to test for XSS from the
    outside.
    Assess strategically not tactically. Asses how security is baked into
    the
    development process and not just in a deployment scenario.
    >
    >
    > On Tue, 03 Dec 2002 01:54:14 -0800 Glyn Geoghegan
    <glyn.geoghegancorsaire.com> wrote:
    > >You also need to determine whether the training you want is
    > >1/ Architecting secure applications
    > >2/ Building secure applications
    > >3/ Application Security Assessments (pentesting)
    > >
    > >Each has a very different target audience, and its own set of
    concerns.
    > >
    > >
    > >Secure application architecture can involve broad concepts (e.g.
    > >using
    > >proper input validation, building a tiered structure of least
    privilege)
    > >or
    > >specifics (e.g. secure .Net design).
    > >
    > >Building secure apps could start with pseudo code examples of
    important
    > >programming concepts and drill down into specific languages with
    > >their pros
    > >and cons.
    > >
    > >Application Security Assessments could take an application slant
    > >on more
    > >typical ethical hacking type courses.
    > >
    > >I believe Stake, ISS and Defcom provide Application courses in
    > >the UK.
    > >http://www.atstake.com/services/education/courses.html
    > >
    > >Glyn.
    > >
    > >> -----Original Message-----
    > >> From: Dan Cuthbert [mailto:danidsec.com]
    > >> Sent: 02 December 2002 21:57
    > >> To: phuc4hushmail.com
    > >> Cc: webappsecsecurityfocus.com
    > >> Subject: Re: WebAppSec Training Courses in UK
    > >>
    > >>
    > >> i think the problem is finding a trainer that understands the
    > >
    > >> problems associated with web applications and security. also
    > >> the trainer that is providing the training would need to have
    > >
    > >> one helluvah understanding of security\building applications
    > >> and the whole process
    > >>
    > >> its a lovely idea... hmmm yeah i can see a owasp opportunity here
    > >>
    > >>
    > >>
    > >> * phuc4hushmail.com (phuc4hushmail.com) wrote:
    > >> >
    > >> > I have unsuccessfully been looking for any decent WebAppSec
    > >
    > >> training
    > >> > courses in the UK.
    > >> >
    > >> > It seems that courses are more on the networking side of things
    > >or
    > >> > when restricted to either specific technologies like J2EE
    > >> or .Net but
    > >> > I have yet to find a useful technology independent course
    > >> that takes
    > >> > in the wider picture as well as the grimey details.
    > >> >
    > >> > Any ideas?
    > >> >
    > >> > Maybe OWASP could start doing training courses?
    > >> >
    > >> >
    > >> >
    > >> >
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    > >>
    > >>
    > >
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