From: Miguel Ruiz Velasco Sobrino (miguelrvsyahoo.com.mx)
Date: Mon Jan 31 2005 - 13:06:05 CST

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> Forwarded Message
> >>
> >
> >Richard M. Smith wrote:
>
> > > < ... > What I still do not understand is how a Web site communicates
> >with the USB key device.
> > >
> > >
>
> >Token-aware browsers (Internet Explorer, Netscape, Mozilla, etc.) can be
> >configured with PKI credentials (e.g., private key and corresponding ID
> >certificate) that are stored either on the PC or on a smart card or USB
> >token. The client's private key is used during the optional (and server
> >controlled) "SSL client authentication" protocol sequence. The token
> >must be "online" at SSL/TLS connect time. The user is prompted to
> >enter his/her user PIN as needed to access the private key (which cannot
> >be read from the token under any circumstance). Use of certificates
> >that have been issued by an Enterprise CA, etc. can help simplify user
> >interaction. For example, the secure website can inform the remote
> >client/browser that it accepts client certificates issued by a certain
> >CA or list of CAs. In that case, other available client certificates,
> >if any, will not be part of the site's user-authentication process.
> >
> >It's important to remember that, SSL connections can be "resumed" for
> >some (server-specified) period of time. The user can revisit the secure
> >site without additional token interaction. Normally, this resume
> >capability is invalidated immediately upon browser program close (since
> >the client's copy of previously negotiated session parameters is
> >deleted) or by expiration of the server/site defined time period. This
> >convenient but somewhat counter-intuitive property of the web browser &
> >underlying protocol operation must be factored into secure application
> >design.
>
> Normally the act of extracting the card from the reader or unplugging the token, makes
> all SSL state to be lost (in a proper designed driver/library), so it takes a bit of
> education to your users.
> Some of the people making crypto discussions here (and in other lists), have a curious
> but fatal misconception: they want to exclude the human factor from security
> frameworks,
> sure, many users are morons but you cannot make a moron (user) proof framework by
> technological means. You have to make an effort educating them to enhance security,
> regardless how good and secure is the design of all the components of the system.
>
> >So the web site communicates with a client machine and browser
> >software. Token operations occur indirectly through browser software,
> >token middleware, and USB device drivers.
> >
> >A couple of fun? details for future reference ...
> >
> >Per current standards, smart cards/tokens can be configured with a
> >"secondary authentication" PIN that must be presented each time a
> >particular signing key is used to perform it's digital signature
> >operation. This "Signing PIN" may be distinct from the User PIN that
> >controls general access to all protected objects on the card (private
> >keys, certificates, data objects, etc.). See the most recent version of
> >RSA's PKCS#11 standard for details. I believe Microsoft supports same
> >or simlar via their CAPI interface. Intended effect is "one digital
> >signature per Signing-PIN presentation".
>
> CAPI for IE, outlook and other windoze programs
> PKCS#11 for NS, mozilla. Also there are others interfaces like MUSCLE.
> And let's face it, in systems other than windoze, the smart card are poorly developed
> by
> a variety of factors, including no vendor interest in the platform.
>
> >Some experts believe that, in some environments, the user's PIN should
> >be entered through a specially designed reader that protects the PIN
> >from being captured (by keyloggers, etc.) -- see "protected
> >authentication path" in PKCS#11. Several vendors have fielded readers
> >with a PINPad capability that allows the PIN to be entered directly
> >through the reader unit (e.g., bypassing the client workstation).
> >
> >If / when such capabilities will be sufficiently viable in commercial
> >products appears to be an open question.
>
> The smart card reader with pinpad are already in the mainstream market, but they are
> more
> expensive than standard ones. I know al least that G&D have one of that. And their SW
> support it, because the other day my boss machine became disconfigured due to infetion
> and suddenly began asking for one of that readers/pinpad (The smarcard windoze logon is
> a
> standard here).
>
> >HTH.
>
>
>
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> Yahoo! Mail - Easier than ever with enhanced search. Learn more.
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>

Forwarded Message
>>
>
>Richard M. Smith wrote:

> > < ... > What I still do not understand is how a Web site communicates
>with the USB key device.
> >
> >

>Token-aware browsers (Internet Explorer, Netscape, Mozilla, etc.) can be
>configured with PKI credentials (e.g., private key and corresponding ID
>certificate) that are stored either on the PC or on a smart card or USB
>token. The client's private key is used during the optional (and server
>controlled) "SSL client authentication" protocol sequence. The token
>must be "online" at SSL/TLS connect time. The user is prompted to
>enter his/her user PIN as needed to access the private key (which cannot
>be read from the token under any circumstance). Use of certificates
>that have been issued by an Enterprise CA, etc. can help simplify user
>interaction. For example, the secure website can inform the remote
>client/browser that it accepts client certificates issued by a certain
>CA or list of CAs. In that case, other available client certificates,
>if any, will not be part of the site's user-authentication process.
>
>It's important to remember that, SSL connections can be "resumed" for
>some (server-specified) period of time. The user can revisit the secure
>site without additional token interaction. Normally, this resume
>capability is invalidated immediately upon browser program close (since
>the client's copy of previously negotiated session parameters is
>deleted) or by expiration of the server/site defined time period. This
>convenient but somewhat counter-intuitive property of the web browser &
>underlying protocol operation must be factored into secure application
>design.

Normally the act of extracting the card from the reader or unplugging the token, makes
all SSL state to be lost (in a proper designed driver/library), so it takes a bit of
education to your users.
Some of the people making crypto discussions here (and in other lists), have a curious
but fatal misconception: they want to exclude the human factor from security frameworks,
sure, many users are morons but you cannot make a moron (user) proof framework by
technological means. You have to make an effort educating them to enhance security,
regardless how good and secure is the design of all the components of the system.

>So the web site communicates with a client machine and browser
>software. Token operations occur indirectly through browser software,
>token middleware, and USB device drivers.
>
>A couple of fun? details for future reference ...
>
>Per current standards, smart cards/tokens can be configured with a
>"secondary authentication" PIN that must be presented each time a
>particular signing key is used to perform it's digital signature
>operation. This "Signing PIN" may be distinct from the User PIN that
>controls general access to all protected objects on the card (private
>keys, certificates, data objects, etc.). See the most recent version of
>RSA's PKCS#11 standard for details. I believe Microsoft supports same
>or simlar via their CAPI interface. Intended effect is "one digital
>signature per Signing-PIN presentation".

CAPI for IE, outlook and other windoze programs
PKCS#11 for NS, mozilla. Also there are others interfaces like MUSCLE.
And let's face it, in systems other than windoze, the smart card are poorly developed by
a variety of factors, including no vendor interest in the platform.

>Some experts believe that, in some environments, the user's PIN should
>be entered through a specially designed reader that protects the PIN
>from being captured (by keyloggers, etc.) -- see "protected
>authentication path" in PKCS#11. Several vendors have fielded readers
>with a PINPad capability that allows the PIN to be entered directly
>through the reader unit (e.g., bypassing the client workstation).
>
>If / when such capabilities will be sufficiently viable in commercial
>products appears to be an open question.

The smart card reader with pinpad are already in the mainstream market, but they are more
expensive than standard ones. I know al least that G&D have one of that. And their SW
support it, because the other day my boss machine became disconfigured due to infetion
and suddenly began asking for one of that readers/pinpad (The smarcard windoze logon is a
standard here).

Miguel Ruiz Velasco

                
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