OSEC

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From: twig les (twigles_at_yahoo.com)
Date: Sun Feb 02 2003 - 19:07:38 CST

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    You raise some good points. Maybe running a second
    instance of snort with a different
    HOME_NET/EXTERNAL_NET would mitigate the problem. I
    agree though, sometimes (many times) it is really
    important to see what is leaving your network.
    Personally we use layer-2 isolation between our
    internal boxes and we don't let our DMZ boxen initiate
    connections out unless they have a legit reason to
    (DNS...).

    --- Jason Haar <Jason.Haartrimble.co.nz> wrote:
    > Just some thoughts to start off the week:
    >
    > I'm running snort probably like most others; I
    > define the internal
    > address-space, then define EXTERNAL as everything
    > else.
    >
    > Most rules work 'round that assumption: the rules
    > search for matches from
    > external addresses hammering at internal addresses.
    > I *assume* the main
    > reasons for that is to allow management to see how
    > necessary information
    > security infrastructure is (ahem), ...and to cut
    > down on false positives? [I
    > ran snort for some time with both internal and
    > external being defined as
    > "any" - to see the differences, and the biggest
    > issue I found was the *huge*
    > increase in false positives, effectively making it
    > impossible to use live
    > that way]
    >
    > IMHO,a problem with this approach is that you end up
    > looking for events that
    > are actually less important than their reverse. I'd
    > say in most peoples'
    > eyes, seeing an incoming CodeRed event is less
    > important than an
    > outgoing, but other than doubling every rule (one
    > for incoming, one for
    > outgoing), I can't see any clean way of doing this.
    >
    > A good example is the current MS-SQL Sapphire worm -
    > like most sites we are
    > "by default" immune to it as our perimeter firewall
    > doesn't allow incoming
    > connections on non-desired ports - so the current
    > alert of:
    >
    > alert udp $EXTERNAL_NET any -> $HOME_NET 1434
    > (msg:"MS-SQL Worm propagation
    > attempt"; content:"|04|"; depth:1; content:"|81 F1
    > 03 01 04 9B 81 F1 01|";
    > content:"sock"; content:"send";
    > reference:bugtraq,5310;
    > classtype:misc-attack; reference:bugtraq,5311;
    > reference:url,vil.nai.com/vil/content/v_99992.htm;
    > sid:2003; rev:2;)
    >
    > ...is of no use to us - except to prove that our
    > firewall is working ;-)
    >
    > What would be more useful is probably a new rule
    > option, something like
    > "also_on_reverse:successful-admin". Such an option
    > could do the same job as
    > reversing the network ranges (i.e. from
    > "$EXTERNAL_NET any -> $HOME_NET
    > 1434" to "$HOME_NET any -> $EXTERNAL_NET 1434"), and
    > changes the classtype
    > to successful-admin. Does that sound too insane?
    > Simply making more of the
    > alerts "any any" doesn't really help, as they would
    > appear under the same
    > classtype - when they are actually more urgent.
    >
    > In fact, this does bring up another question: the
    > usefulness of the current
    > "classtype" option. One thing I'm really missing
    > from snort is the ability
    > to trigger alerts on some cleanly-defined situations
    > - such as noticing that
    > a LAN box is attempting to upload CodeRed/Sapphire
    > onto a remote box.
    > Currently if I look at our Snort alerts DB, I see
    > tonnes of priority 1
    > events - but they're all things like incoming
    > CodeRed - of no consequence.
    > Currently I rely on writing good swatch triggers so
    > that I only trigger
    > email alerts when snort sees a LAN to Internet
    > event, but given the
    > existing fine-grain classifications within snort, I
    > venture this really is a
    > snort issue, and not an post-filtering issue.
    >
    > Shouldn't snort look at classifying "you've been
    > compromised" as higher than
    > "they've been compromised"? Perhaps a priority 0
    > would be easiest? :-)
    >
    > Anyway, just some thoughts...
    >
    > --
    > Cheers
    >
    > Jason Haar
    > Information Security Manager, Trimble Navigation
    > Ltd.
    > Phone: +64 3 9635 377 Fax: +64 3 9635 417
    > PGP Fingerprint: 7A2E 0407 C9A6 CAF6 2B9F 8422 C063
    > 5EBB FE1D 66D1
    >
    >
    >
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    =====
    -----------------------------------------------------------
    Know yourself and know your enemy and you will never fear defeat.
    -----------------------------------------------------------

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