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From: Microsoft (0_26426_8C6DCD38-0E69-43C4-B1D6-829BA0F2BCAF_USNewsletters.Microsoft.com)
Date: Wed Feb 27 2002 - 22:27:50 CST

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    -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----

    - ----------------------------------------------------------------------
    Title: Authentication Flaw Could Allow Unauthorized Users To
                Authenticate To SMTP Service
    Date: 27 February 2002
    Software: Microsoft Windows 2000; Microsoft Exchange Server 5.5
    Impact: Mail Relaying
    Max Risk: Low
    Bulletin: MS02-011

    Microsoft encourages customers to review the Security Bulletin at:
    http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/bulletin/MS02-011.asp.
    - ----------------------------------------------------------------------

    Issue:
    ======
    An SMTP service installs by default as part of Windows 2000 server
    products and as part of the Internet Mail Connector (IMC) for
    Microsoft Exchange Server 5.5. (The IMC, also known as the
    Microsoft Exchange Internet Mail Service, provides access and
    message exchange to and from any system that uses SMTP). A
    vulnerability results in both services because of a flaw in the
    way they handle a valid response from the NTLM authentication
    layer of the underlying operating system.

    By design, the Windows 2000 SMTP service and the
    Exchange Server 5.5 IMC, upon receiving notification from
    the NTLM authentication layer that a user has been authenticated,
    should perform additional checks before granting the user access
    to the service. The vulnerability results because the affected
    services don't perform this additional checking correctly. In
    some cases, this could result in the SMTP service granting access
    to a user solely on the basis of their ability to successfully
    authenticate to the server.

    An attacker who exploited the vulnerability could gain only
    user-level privileges on the SMTP service, thereby enabling the
    attacker to use the service but not to administer it. The most
    likely purpose in exploiting the vulnerability would be to
    perform mail relaying via the server.

    Mitigating Factors:
    ====================
     - Exchange 2000 servers are not affected by the vulnerability
       because they correctly handle the authentication process to the
       SMTP service.

     - The vulnerability would not enable the attacker to read other
       users' email, nor to send mail as other users.

     - Best practices recommend disabling unneeded services. If the
       SMTP service has been disabled, the mail relaying vulnerability
       could not be exploited.

     - The vulnerability would not grant administrative privileges to
       the service, nor would it grant the attacker the ability to run
       programs or operating system commands.

    Risk Rating:
    ============
     - Internet systems: Low
     - Intranet systems: Low
     - Client systems: Low

    Patch Availability:
    ===================
     - A patch is available to fix this vulnerability. Please read the
       Security Bulletin at
       http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/bulletin/ms02-011.asp
       for information on obtaining this patch.

    Acknowledgment:
    ===============
     - BindView's RAZOR Team (http://razor.bindview.com)

    - ---------------------------------------------------------------------

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