> I know this may not be what we are really about,
> being
> more on the good side of the law than bad, but what
> are the
> potential uses for this?

Well, I'm going to jump right in, knowing full well
that this thread is going to end up generating a lot
of theoretical, untested, undocumented stuff. My hope
is that anything someone posts is done so in such a
way as to be reproduceable, as it will help us all
understand and therefore protect against the issue.
 
> I've seen discussions on how adses can be used to
> hide a
> large amount of data, making it unable to be viewed
> using
> the normal utilities while performing a DOS on the
> server by
> taking up all available space.

Yes, a simple 'do...while(1)' that copies a file into
successive ADSs will eventually fill up all of the
usable space on the drive.
 
> I've seen discussions on how virus writers could use
> an ads
> to send a virus to a machine and make it hidden from
> Antivirus
> programs, then just execute it later. If
> autoprotect is
> enabled, preventing a lot of the malicious
> activities, this
> could have limited affects.

Correct. The W2k.stream virus from Benny and Ratter
of 29A didn't really 'use' ADSs, per se, in any
malicious manner. And AutoProtect may work well
enough for some A/V products to protect the system.
But keep in mind that signature-based tools need to be
updated, so designing a new bit of malware, and using
it in a truly stealthy manner, could work for quite a
while. After all, isn't the reason that a lot of the
current viruses and malware are detected so quickly is
b/c they're so 'in your face' and 'noisy'?
 
> The barriers that I have seen:
>
> * Running an ads is not as easy as typing the
> pseudo-name.
> * An ads requires that the :realname.ext section be
> part
> of the filename. This makes them hard to hide and
> hard
> to transport with normal means: web, email,
> napster, etc.

Also keep in mind that:
(a) applications that only *read* the file contents,
such as graphics and multimedia viewers, don't usually
execute any arbitrary data they find in, or associated
with, the file.

(b) copying an ADS-laden file across a non-NTFS file
system destroys the ADS.
 
So, at least for now, ADSs seem to be about as you put
it...useful for file hiding and some limited
executable storage. However, the issue really isn't
the technology itself, but the human factor. Yes, we
are discussing here, in a public forum, so maybe now
more people will be aware of the issue. But not
everyone who currently uses NT/2K, or who will be
tomorrow, are aware of ADSs.

It's similar to the vulnerability issue. IIS's dir
transversal exploit was patched in Nov '00, and
sadmin/IIS (aka, poisonbox) was fairly wide ranging.
So, the information was there and publicly available,
but ignored. Code Red was similar...many folks, and
even Microsoft to a degree, had been saying that 'best
practices' includes removing/disabling unnecessary
services or functionality. To me, script mappings in
IIS constitute 'functionality', and if I don't have
any pages ending in .ida or .idq on my web site, I'd
disable the script mapping. Doing so would protect
anyone from Code Red, w/o having to wait for an
install a patch.

So, my point is...yeah some of us know about it.
There are tools available to detect them. I've seen
screen captures of EnCase in which ADSs were used, and
heard from forensics analysts who regularly look for
ADSs. But does this mean that ADSs will never be used
in an offensive manner? Not hardly. In fact, one
would think that with more visibility, we're likely to
see them more often in the future.

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