OSEC

Neohapsis is currently accepting applications for employment. For more information, please visit our website www.neohapsis.com or email hr@neohapsis.com
 
From: Rhino Bond (rhino007_usyahoo.com)
Date: Tue May 14 2002 - 12:54:24 CDT

  • Messages sorted by: [ date ] [ thread ] [ subject ] [ author ]

    Folks,

    Just to clarify what we are looking for. We know how
    to configure all the seperate parts (routers,
    firewalls, IDS, etc.). We were wondering if anyone
    ever wrote a white paper on creating an engine to
    automate/manage all the individual parts. So far I
    have found nothing. This is a Herculian project I
    think... However I want to thank everyone for their
    contributions to this tread, they were all very
    interesting.

    Regards, David

    David R. Hawley, CEO ~ CISSP
    UNIX & NT NETWORK SECURITY, LLC
    1980 16th St. Ste, P-209
    Newport Beach, CA 92663
    949-645-5932

    --- Geoff Galitz <galitzchem.berkeley.edu> wrote:
    >
    > On Friday, May 10, 2002, at 06:05 PM, Harvey
    > Newstrom wrote:
    >
    > >
    > > On Thursday, May 9, 2002, at 03:47 pm, Ray Parks
    > wrote:
    > >> Just remember this aphorism - Depth without
    > Breadth is useless.
    > >> We engaged in a series of experiments within
    > the DARPA IA program in
    > >> which we proved that Defense in Depth is an
    > over-rated concept.
    > >> Layered
    > >> defenses can actually be weaker than single
    > defenses because
    > >> administrators/developers think that another
    > layer is providing the
    > >> defense
    > >> they are ignoring. The results of these
    > experiments were recorded in a
    > >> paper, unfortunately I don't have a cite at this
    > time.
    > >> Bottom line - we were able to get through
    > layers of defense in depth
    > >> because we could attack each layer in a different
    > way. This allowed
    > >> attacks to woogle through to the goal despite
    > multiple layers of
    > >> defense.
    > >>
    > >
    > > I have seen similar studies long ago relating to
    > alarm monitoring.
    > > Items being monitored by multiple people had worse
    > response times than
    > > items monitored by a single person! It turned out
    > that people would
    > > frequently be lax and assume that someone else was
    > handling it.
    > >
    > > I have also seen this scenario in help desk or
    > message queues. Some
    > > ringing phones or e-mails would remain unanswered
    > for days because
    > > everybody was answering other items and assumed
    > the missed item would
    > > be caught by somebody else somewhere.
    >
    >
    > I would point out that the issues cited above are
    > issues of
    > deployment and internal procedure which are separate
    > from
    > the network vulnerability issues. Of course, the
    > two are linked,
    > but the lesson to take home is that the right answer
    > will vary
    > between different organizations. The variables
    > include how
    > well the security operation runs, is it integrated
    > with the general
    > IT organization, how responsive are those teams in
    > general,
    > do they have well-functioning and well-known
    > procedures and
    > so on...
    >
    > One size does not fit all.
    >
    > -geoff
    >
    >
    >
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    > Geoff Galitz |
    > UC Berkeley |
    > D'oh!
    > galitzuclink.berkeley.edu |
    > http://www.cchem.berkeley.edu/College/unix
    > http://www.cchem.berkeley.edu/~galitz
    >

    __________________________________________________
    Do You Yahoo!?
    LAUNCH - Your Yahoo! Music Experience
    http://launch.yahoo.com