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Re: Thwarting /bin/bash, an anti-overflow concept ?
From: security (securitykalamiteit.nl)
Date: Wed Jan 07 2004 - 10:21:30 CST
well actually most exploits are calling /bin/sh .. but anyways .. you
cannot escape that by removing bash or anything like that .. you "GOTTA"
have a /bin/sh as there are so many programs that need that .. what you
can do is to add the shells and users that have access to them to a
special group! and restrict access to those users!
Alex Schütz wrote:
> Dear Vuln-Dev's,
> Recently I had a simple idea about preventing hack attacks. Most
> buffer overflows are pretty happy calling /bin/bash as a final means
> to get an unauthorized root shell.
> However, if we do not have any shell, what is going to happen ?
> There's no /bin/bash to call, thus, the exploit will surely crash some
> application, but its final goal will be thwarted.
> Ofcourse we could rename /bin/bash to /bin/whatever_we_want, and thus
> add some security by obscurity, but the next exploit is going to cat
> /etc/shells or /etc/passwd, and then the attacker knows the name of
> the shell.
> Anyhow, if we delete all shells... how safe are we, then ? (Ignoring
> the case that crontab might not work anymore...)
> Thinking this farther, we are going to force the exploit developer to
> bring along his own binary code of /bin/bash. This may not be possible
> in every case, since the buffer overflow cannot hold so much data.
> Or we could code some kernel module that restricts any permission to
> call /bin/bash by only a few selected trusted programs, i.e. /bin/login .
> What do you think ? Please let me know.
> Yours, Alex