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Re: iis 5 %00 null weirdness
securityfocus
poulsennet.com
Date: Mon Feb 16 2004 - 08:14:46 CST
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This is an "old" vulnerability adressed in KB832894. The description and patch can be found on
http://www.microsoft.com/technet/treeview/default.asp?url=/technet/security/bulletin/ms04-004.asp
Kind Regards
Michael Poulsen, CISSP
----- Original Message -----
From: Chris Katscher
To: vuln-dev
securityfocus.com
Sent: 11 Feb 2004 21:17:33 -0000
Subject: Re: iis 5 %00 null weirdness
In-Reply-To: <web-23498678
gator.darkhorse.com>
I have no idea what is going on with this "vulnerability" but I can't find anything about it on
Microsoft's site. They either don't know about it or are trying to keep it quiet. I will say
this, scammers REALLY know about it. I have gotten two scam emails in the past few weeks using
this vulnerability.
Here:
From: "Flightiest G. Lever" <support
yahoo-services.com>
Date: Sun, 25 Jan 2004 12:51:36 -0500
Subject: Important Information Regarding Your Account cO3VRQmN
The email looks very professional, in fact it fooled me into thinking it was an actual yahoo site
that might have gotten r00ted by a scammer, and tries to get me to click on the link:
http://wallet.yahoo.com%00
211.174.60.96/manual/images/
Here is another example:
From: "_Yahoo*" <herb
zipolite.com>
Date: Sat, 07 Feb 2004 14:27:37 -0500
Subject: _Your _Yahoo user id (spatch3
yahoo.com)
This is a very unprofessional email and tries to get you to click on the link:
http://Spatch.yahoo.com%00
%75%68%6b%72%6539%65%64%2e%44%61%2e%52%75/%3f%708%510%78
Which I have decoded the domain to be:
uhkre39ed.Da.Ru/?p8Q0x
I have already sent complaint emails about these scams to the proper domain registrars, however
what really bothers me, is that IE is vulnerable to this type of human trickery. Even _I_ was
fooled when I first saw it, and I don't fool easily. It wasn't until I copied the URL and then
pasted it into notepad and then clicked on it in Netscape that I saw where the URL was really
re-directing me to. Since this kind of hidden URL exploit doesn't work in Netscape 6.2 I'll
definitely call it an IE 5.5 bug.
BTW: the characters before the
must be:
hex: 01 25 30 30
which looks like:
%00
Hope this helps!
Chris Katscher
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>From: "wirepair" <wirepair
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>Subject: iis 5 %00 null weirdness
>To: vuln-dev
securityfocus.com
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>Date: Thu, 11 Dec 2003 11:15:38 -0800
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>
>lo all,
>While playing with IIS I was messing around with the old school webhits vuln, i tried injecting
some null characters to see
>how it would respond. To my surprise I all of a sudden got the web page I requested, (not the
source just the page). But
>the images were all broken, this obviously piqued my interested so i viewed the info of the page.
>When requesting an asp page (or aspx), such as
>http://iisserver/iisstart.asp%00/%00/%00/
>you'll notice the image file now contains the path:
>http://iisserver/iisstart.asp%00/%00/%00/pagerror.gif
>Any link from the asp page requested will have the null bytes injected into its path.
>It isn't just nulls either you can basicalyl (after the first one) inject any string:
>http://iisserver/iisstart.asp%00/%2e%2e/
>Shows the broken image as having the path:
>http://iisserver/iisstart.asp%00/%2e%2e/pagerror.gif
>Now i assume this isn't normal behaviour but my questions are:
>A. Why is this happening?
>and
>B. Is there anyway we can take advantage of this?
>
>I tried the obvious stuff like movign the pagerror.gif outside the webroot, and it still showed up
>as a broken image so i assume the %00 is causing the %2e%2e to not *actually* break the web root.
>Any thoughts folks?
>-wire
>
>Everyone has a plan until they get hit.
>--
>Visit Things From Another World for the best
>comics, movies, toys, collectibles and more.
>http://www.tfaw.com/?qt=wmf
>
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