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From: Steve (stevesecuresolutions.org)
Date: Wed Jul 25 2001 - 01:08:11 CDT

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    > CERT Advisory CA-2001-21 Buffer Overflow in telnetd
    >
    > Original release date: July 24, 2001
    > Last revised: --
    > Source: CERT/CC
    >
    > A complete revision history can be found at the end of this file.
    >
    > Systems Affected
    >
    > Systems running versions of telnetd derived from BSD source.
    >
    > Overview
    >
    > The telnetd program is a server for the Telnet remote virtual terminal
    > protocol. There is a remotely exploitable buffer overflow in Telnet
    > daemons derived from BSD source code. This vulnerability can crash the
    > server, or be leveraged to gain root access.
    >
    > I. Description
    >
    > There is a remotely exploitable buffer overflow in Telnet daemons
    > derived from BSD source code. During the processing of the Telnet
    > protocol options, the results of the "telrcv" function are stored in a
    > fixed-size buffer. It is assumed that the results are smaller than the
    > buffer and no bounds checking is performed.
    >
    > The vulnerability was discovered by TESO. An exploit for this
    > vulnerability has been publicly released; internal testing at CERT/CC
    > confirms this exploit works against at least one target system. For
    > more information, see
    >
    > http://www.team-teso.net/advisories/teso-advisory-011.tar.gz
    >
    > II. Impact
    >
    > An intruder can execute arbitrary code with the privileges of the
    > telnetd process, typically root.
    >
    > III. Solution
    >
    > Apply a patch
    >
    > Appendix A contains information from vendors who have provided
    > information for this advisory. We will update the appendix as we
    > receive more information. If you do not see your vendor's name, the
    > CERT/CC did not hear from that vendor. Please contact your vendor
    > directly.
    >
    > Restrict access to the Telnet service (typically port 23/tcp) using a
    > firewall or packet-filtering technology.
    >
    > Until a patch can be applied, you may wish to block access to the
    > Telnet service from outside your network perimeter. This will limit
    > your exposure to attacks. However, blocking port 23/tcp at a network
    > perimeter would still allow attackers within the perimeter of your
    > network to exploit the vulnerability. It is important to understand
    > your network's configuration and service requirements before deciding
    > what changes are appropriate.
    >
    > Appendix A. - Vendor Information
    >
    > This appendix contains information provided by vendors for this
    > advisory. When vendors report new information to the CERT/CC, we
    > update this section and note the changes in our revision history. If a
    > particular vendor is not listed below, we have not received their
    > comments.
    >
    > BSDI
    >
    > All current versions of BSD/OS are vulnerable. Patches are available
    > via our web site at http://www.bsdi.com/services/support/patches and
    > via ftp at ftp://ftp.bsdi.com/bsdi/support/patches as soon as testing
    > has been completed.
    >
    > Cisco Systems
    >
    > Cisco IOS does not appear to be vulnerable. Certain non-IOS products
    > are supplied on other operating system platforms which themselves may
    > be vulnerable as described elsewhere in this CERT Advisory. The Cisco
    > PSIRT is continuing to investigate the vulnerability to be certain
    > and, if necessary, will provide updates to the CERT and publish an
    > advisory. Cisco Security Advisories are on-line at
    > http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt/.
    >
    > FreeBSD
    >
    > All released versions of FreeBSD are vulnerable to this problem, which
    > was fixed in FreeBSD 4.3-STABLE and FreeBSD 3.5.1-STABLE on July 23,
    > 2001. An advisory has been released, along with a patch to correct the
    > vulnerability and a binary upgrade package suitable for use on FreeBSD
    > 4.3-RELEASE systems. For more information, see the advisory at the
    > following location:
    >
    >
    ftp://ftp.freebsd.org/pub/FreeBSD/CERT/advisories/FreeBSD-SA-01:49.telnetd.a
    sc
    >
    > or use an FTP mirror site from the following URL:
    >
    > http://www.freebsd.org/doc/en_US.ISO8859-1/books/handbook/mirrors-ftp.html
    >
    > Hewlett-Packard
    >
    > [This issue is] actively under investigation to determine
    > vulnerability ramifications.
    >
    > Sun Microsystems
    >
    > Sun is currently investigating and have confirmed that one can make
    > the in.telnetd daemon dump core but Sun has not yet determined if this
    > issue is potentially exploitable on Solaris.
    >
    > Appendix B. - References
    >
    > 1. http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc0854.txt
    > 2. http://www.team-teso.net/advisories/teso-advisory-011.tar.gz
    > 3. http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/745371
    > 4.
    ftp://ftp.FreeBSD.org/pub/FreeBSD/CERT/advisories/FreeBSD-SA-01:49.telnetd.a
    sc
    > _________________________________________________________________
    > _________________________________________________________________
    >
    > The CERT Coordination Center thanks TESO, who published an advisory on
    > this issue. We would also like to thank Jeff Polk for technical
    > assistance.
    > _________________________________________________________________
    >
    > Authors: Jason A. Rafail, Ian A. Finlay, and Shawn V. Hernan.
    > ______________________________________________________________________
    >
    > This document is available from:
    > http://www.cert.org/advisories/CA-2001-21.html
    > ______________________________________________________________________
    >
    > CERT/CC Contact Information
    >
    > Email: certcert.org
    > Phone: +1 412-268-7090 (24-hour hotline)
    > Fax: +1 412-268-6989
    > Postal address:
    > CERT Coordination Center
    > Software Engineering Institute
    > Carnegie Mellon University
    > Pittsburgh PA 15213-3890
    > U.S.A.
    >
    > CERT personnel answer the hotline 08:00-17:00 EST(GMT-5) / EDT(GMT-4)
    > Monday through Friday; they are on call for emergencies during other
    > hours, on U.S. holidays, and on weekends.
    >
    > Using encryption
    >
    > We strongly urge you to encrypt sensitive information sent by email.
    > Our public PGP key is available from
    >
    > http://www.cert.org/CERT_PGP.key
    >
    > If you prefer to use DES, please call the CERT hotline for more
    > information.
    >
    > Getting security information
    >
    > CERT publications and other security information are available from
    > our web site
    >
    > http://www.cert.org/
    >
    > To subscribe to the CERT mailing list for advisories and bulletins,
    > send email to majordomocert.org. Please include in the body of your
    > message
    >
    > subscribe cert-advisory
    >
    > * "CERT" and "CERT Coordination Center" are registered in the U.S.
    > Patent and Trademark Office.
    > ______________________________________________________________________
    >
    > NO WARRANTY
    > Any material furnished by Carnegie Mellon University and the Software
    > Engineering Institute is furnished on an "as is" basis. Carnegie
    > Mellon University makes no warranties of any kind, either expressed or
    > implied as to any matter including, but not limited to, warranty of
    > fitness for a particular purpose or merchantability, exclusivity or
    > results obtained from use of the material. Carnegie Mellon University
    > does not make any warranty of any kind with respect to freedom from
    > patent, trademark, or copyright infringement.
    > _________________________________________________________________
    >
    > Conditions for use, disclaimers, and sponsorship information
    >
    > Copyright 2001 Carnegie Mellon University.
    >
    > Revision History
    > July 24, 2001: Initial release
    >
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