OSEC

Neohapsis is currently accepting applications for employment. For more information, please visit our website www.neohapsis.com or email hr@neohapsis.com
 
From: Steve (stevesecuresolutions.org)
Date: Mon Nov 12 2001 - 20:29:27 CST

  • Messages sorted by: [ date ] [ thread ] [ subject ] [ author ]

    Team RADIX Research Report: RADIX1112200102

    Date Published: 11-12-2001
    Research Report ID: RADIX1112200102
    Bugtraq ID: 3184
    CVE CAN: N/A
    Title: RunAs Sensitive Data Exposure
    Class: Sensitive data exposure
    Remotely Exploitable: No
    Locally Exploitable: Yes

    Vulnerability Description:
    The command line utility "RunAs" leverages the RunAs service in an
    effort of launching an application in a distinct security context.
    However, the utility suffers from the fact that the buffer is never
    erased after the application terminates execution.

    Vulnerable Systems: Microsoft Windows 2000

    Solution/Vendor Information/Workaround:
    The vendor has decided to include the fix within service pack 3 (SP3).

    According to the vendor, "In February 2002, we will release Windows 2000
    Service Pack 3 (SP3)".

    http://www.microsoft.com/presspass/features/2001/oct01/10-03securityqa.a
    sp

    When service pack 3 is released, Camisade recommends installing it.

    In the meantime, do not use the RunAs service. If RunAs is never used,
    no application may allocate a page that contains RunAs-related
    authentication credentials. However, do not disable the RunAs service.
    The RADIX1112200101 vulnerability can only be exploited if the RunAs
    service is not running. The malicious attacker is performing a man in
    the middle attack using a malicious RunAs service.

    Summary: Ensure the RunAs service is in it's default setting
    (automatically started and running). The default install of the service,
    unused and not set to manual (or disabled) is the safest method until
    service pack 3 is released. As a temporary solution, do not use any
    utilities that leverage the RunAs service. This includes the RunAs
    command line utility and Explorer's RunAs functionality.

    Vendor notified on: 09-10-2001

    The vendor was notified, and confirmed receipt, approximately two months
    ago. In keeping with the Camisade Research Report Policy, the
    information has been made public to best benefit the security community
    through full disclosure.

    Credits:
    Camisade - Team RADIX (researchcamisade.com) http://www.camisade.com

    This advisory was drafted with the help of the SecurityFocus.com
    Vulnerability Help Team. For more information or assistance drafting
    advisories please mail vulnhelpsecurityfocus.com.

    Technical Description - Proof of Concept Code:
    Applications that deal with highly sensitive data, such as user
    credentials, must ensure that those credentials are sufficiently
    destroyed after their use.

    The RunAs utility performs no such destruction with credentials supplied
    by the user. They are left, in plaintext, on the application's stack
    when the application has terminated. Those credentials will be present
    when an arbitrary application or driver has reallocated that particular
    allocation page.

    A malicious application could wait for a RunAs session to terminate then
    subsequently search for that user's credentials. In order to execute
    this vulnerability, the malicious user must have interactive access to
    the Windows 2000 machine. Because of this, Windows 2000 Terminal
    services would be most applicable for an attack.

    -- 
    Team RADIX -- Camisade LLC
    http://www.camisade.com
    Application Security Innovations
    Camisade Direct: 1.800.709.1241