OSEC

Neohapsis is currently accepting applications for employment. For more information, please visit our website www.neohapsis.com or email hr@neohapsis.com
 
From: David Endler (dendler_at_idefense.com)
Date: Thu Aug 08 2002 - 03:27:40 CDT

  • Messages sorted by: [ date ] [ thread ] [ subject ] [ author ]

    iDEFENSE Security Advisory 08.08.2002
    iSCSI Default Configuration File Settings

    DESCRIPTION

    iSCSI is a popular new protocol that allows the SCSI protocol
    to be used over traditional IP networks. This allows for SAN
    like storage arrays without requiring new network
    infrastructure. iSCSI’s primary authentication mechanism for
    users is the CHAP protocol (Challenge Handshake Authentication
    Protocol), which is very resilient against replay attacks and
    provides strong protection for the user’s password. The CHAP
    protocol requires the user’s password to connect, and in order
    to automate this process the user must provide the cleartext
    password to the system that is then stored, typically in
    cleartext, so that it will be accessible when needed. Care
    must be taken to ensure configuration files containing the
    cleartext password are properly protected. For more
    information on the CHAP protocol please see RFC 1994.

    The primary iSCSI implementation for Linux, “Linux-iSCSI” is a
    freely available software package primarily maintained by
    Cisco Systems. This package stores it primary configuration
    directives in the file:

    /etc/iscsi.conf

    This file is created world writeable by default and no mention
    is made in the file of the importance of protecting it from
    being read by attackers. At least one vendor has shipped this
    file world readable in the default configuration of a beta
    release of an operating system, when notified they stated it
    would be fixed in the release version of the operating system.

    ANALYSIS

    Any authentication systems that require cleartext passwords to
    be stored should be carefully audited to ensure that passwords
    are properly protected. This problem can also potentially
    affect numerous packages, ranging from NTP and BIND to iSCSI
    all of which require stored passwords or secrets.

    DETECTION

    Check the permissions on the file:

    /etc/iscsi.conf

    The file should be owned by the user and group root, and only
    the root user should be granted read and write access to the
    file, all other permissions should be removed (i.e. file
    permissions should be 0400)

    VENDOR RESPONSE

    Red Hat has confirmed that the file /etc/iscsi.conf was set
    world readable in the Limbo Beta, and that it will be fixed in
    the next release version of Red Hat Linux. SuSE has confirmed
    that the file permissions are set correctly on
    /etc/iscsi.conf. No other major Linux vendors appear to be
    shipping the iSCSI package yet.

    DISCOVERY CREDIT

    Kurt Seifried (kurtseifried.org)

    DISCLOSURE TIMELINE

    July 11, 2002: Problem found on Red Hat Linux Limbo Beta #1
                          Initial contacts sent to Red Hat, SuSE and Cisco

    July 12, 2002: SuSE confirms file mode 600 by default, not
    vulnerable
    Email sent to Matthew Franz at Cisco, additional Cisco
    employees also contacted, iSCSI for Linux is an external
    project at Cisco, PSIRT was not used, no response ever
    received.

    July 17, 2002: iDEFENSE client disclosure

    July 29, 20022: Problem confirmed in Red Hat Limbo Beta #2,
    Red Hat contacted again, no response received.

    August 6, 2002: No update of Linux iSCSI, nor mention of
    problem on website.

    August 8, 2002: Public Advisory

    http://www.idefense.com/contributor.html

    David Endler, CISSP
    Director, Technical Intelligence
    iDEFENSE, Inc.
    14151 Newbrook Drive
    Suite 100
    Chantilly, VA 20151
    voice: 703-344-2632
    fax: 703-961-1071

    dendleridefense.com
    www.idefense.com