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From: Microsoft Product Security (secnotifMICROSOFT.COM)
Date: Wed May 16 2001 - 19:33:20 CDT

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    The following is a Security Bulletin from the Microsoft Product Security
    Notification Service.

    Please do not reply to this message, as it was sent from an unattended
    mailbox.
                        ********************************

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    - ----------------------------------------------------------------------
    Title: Flaws in Web Server Certificate Validation Could
                Enable Spoofing
    Date: 16 May 2001
    Software: Internet Explorer
    Impact: Spoofing of trusted web site
    Bulletin: MS01-027

    Microsoft encourages customers to review the Security Bulletin at:
    http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/bulletin/MS01-027.asp.
    - ----------------------------------------------------------------------

    Issue:
    ======
    A patch is available to eliminate two newly discovered
    vulnerabilities
    affecting Internet Explorer, both of which could enable an attacker
    to
    spoof trusted web sites. The first vulnerability involves how digital
    certificates from web servers are validated. When CRL checking for
    such
    certificates is enabled, it could be possible for any or all of the
    following checks to no longer be performed:
     - Verification that the certificate has not expired
     - Verification that the server name matches the name on the
       certificate
     - Verification that the issuer of the certificate is trusted

    The second vulnerability could enable a web page to display the URL
    from a different web site in the IE address bar. This spoofing could
    occur within a valid SSL session with the impersonated site. Both
    vulnerabilities could be used to convince a user that the attacker's
    web site was actually a different one - one that the user presumably
    trusts and would provide sensitive information to. However, as
    discussed in the Mitigating Factors section below, there would be
    significant hurdles to exploiting either vulnerability.

    In addition to eliminating the two new vulnerabilities, the patch
    also
    eliminates two new variants of a previously discussed vulnerability,
    the "Frame Domain Verification" vulnerability, which originally was
    discussed in Microsoft Security Bulletin MS00-033. Like the original
    version, these new variants vulnerability could enable a malicious
    web
    site operator to open two browser windows, one in the web site's
    domain
    and the other on the user's local file system, and to pass
    information
    from the latter to the former. This could enable the web site
    operator
    to read any file on the user's local computer that could be opened in
    a
    browser window.

    The patch also incorporates the functionality of the patch provided
    in
    Microsoft Security Bulletin MS01-020
    (http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/bulletin/MS01-020.asp).

    Mitigating Factors:
    ====================
    Server certificate validation vulnerability:
     - The vulnerability only affects how certificates from web
       servers are validated. It does not affect how code-signing
       certificates or any other type of certificate are validated.
     - The specific checks that might be bypassed vary with both
       the user and the actions she may have taken during the
       current browsing session. An attacker could not predict with
       any degree of certainty which checks might be bypassed in a
       particular case.
     - The vulnerability does not provide any way to force users
       to the attacker's web site. It is likely that this
       vulnerability could only be exploited in conjunction with a
       successful DNS poisoning or similar attack.

    Web page spoofing vulnerability:
     - Like the vulnerability above, this vulnerability would not
       provide any way to force users to the attacker's web site,
       and DNS poisoning or other measures would likely be required
       to exploit it.
     - Any hyperlinks within the page would correctly show the target.
       As a result, the attacker would need to point these to bona
       fide locations on the spoofed web site, with the result that
       the attacker would likely only be able to spoof a single web
       page, rather than an entire site.

    New variants of "Frame Domain Verification" vulnerability:
     - The vulnerability could only be used to read - not add, delete
       or change - files.
     - The attacker would need to know the exact name and location of
       every file he wished to read.
     - The vulnerability could only be used to read file types that
       can be opened within a browser window - for example, .htm,
       .txt or .doc files, but not .exe or .xls files.

    Patch Availability:
    ===================
     - A patch is available to fix this vulnerability. Please read the
       Security Bulletin
       http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/bulletin/ms01-027.asp
       for information on obtaining this patch.

    - ---------------------------------------------------------------------

    THE INFORMATION PROVIDED IN THE MICROSOFT KNOWLEDGE BASE IS PROVIDED
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    MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. IN NO EVENT
    SHALL
    MICROSOFT CORPORATION OR ITS SUPPLIERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DAMAGES
    WHATSOEVER INCLUDING DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, CONSEQUENTIAL,
    LOSS
    OF BUSINESS PROFITS OR SPECIAL DAMAGES, EVEN IF MICROSOFT CORPORATION
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    SOME STATES DO NOT ALLOW THE EXCLUSION OR LIMITATION OF LIABILITY FOR
    CONSEQUENTIAL OR INCIDENTAL DAMAGES SO THE FOREGOING LIMITATION MAY
    NOT
    APPLY.

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