OSEC

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From: David LeBlanc (dleblancMINDSPRING.COM)
Date: Sat Aug 04 2001 - 02:05:01 CDT

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    The 'advisory' is bogus.

    If an attacker has gained admin-level access to your machine, you have to
    flatten it. Period. Given the same conditions, the attacker could have
    installed 57 different backdoors and rootkits. Given admin-level access, I
    could just open the raw disk and start changing random bytes. I could do all
    sorts of horrible things, probably even screw up the BIOS. The mind boggles
    at the possibilities, to quote Sylvester the Cat.

    Once the attacker gains admin-level access, it is game over.

    > -----Original Message-----
    > From: Jopasc [mailto:JopascBARRYSWORLD.COM]
    > Sent: Friday, August 03, 2001 10:26 AM
    > To: win2ksecadviceLISTSERV.NTSECURITY.NET
    > Subject: Re: A damaging local DoS in WinNT SP6a
    >
    >
    > The advisory is regarding a DoS.....
    >
    > Using other exploits, such as unicode etc, an attacker could
    > upload this
    > tool to a machine and run it thus forcing the owner of the
    > site to rebuild
    > the box from scratch or restore from a backup.
    >
    > Therefore the advisory is valid. Using another exploit to
    > delete needed
    > NT4 boot files would have a similar effect except those files
    > can replaced
    > using a DOS / NTFS boot disk depending on the setup. A corrupt SAM is
    > normally unfixable...
    >
    > ----- Original Message -----
    > From: "Ken Pfeil" <KenINFOSEC101.ORG>
    > To: <win2ksecadviceLISTSERV.NTSECURITY.NET>
    > Sent: 03 August 2001 16:18
    > Subject: Re: A damaging local DoS in WinNT SP6a
    >
    >
    > > hehe..
    > > Running a cracking tool can do damage to your system. Did you REALLY
    > expect
    > > MS to take this seriously? Thanks for the chuckle. Another
    > solution would
    > be
    > > to not run cracking code on your system in the first place.
    > >
    > > > -----Original Message-----
    > > > From: Steve [mailto:steveSECURESOLUTIONS.ORG]
    > > > Sent: Friday, August 03, 2001 11:04 AM
    > > > To: win2ksecadviceLISTSERV.NTSECURITY.NET
    > > > Subject: A damaging local DoS in WinNT SP6a
    > > >
    > > >
    > > > The attached advisory can also be found at:
    > > > http://hypoclear.cjb.net/hypo_nt_dos.txt
    > > >
    > > > ---
    > > >
    > > > [[:hypoclear security advisory:]]
    > > >
    > > >
    > > > Vendor : Microsoft | http://www.microsoft.com
    > > > Product : Windows NT SP6a (and lower?)
    > > > Category : Local DoS
    > > > Date : 08-03-01
    > > >
    > > >
    > > > CONTENTS
    > > > 1. Overview
    > > > 2. Details
    > > > 3. Exploit
    > > > 4. Possible Solution
    > > > 5. Vendor Response
    > > > 6. Credits
    > > > 7. Contact
    > > > 8. Disclaimer
    > > >
    > > >
    > > > 1. Overview:
    > > >
    > > > WindowsNT SP6a is subject to a local Denial of Service
    > (DoS) attack,
    > > > upon running "NT4ALL". This particular vulnerability has
    > the potential
    > > > to permanently damage the workstation/server, because no
    > users are able
    > > > to "log on" to the computer after NT4ALL is run.
    > > >
    > > >
    > > >
    > > > 2. Details:
    > > >
    > > > NT4ALL is a program written by 9 (nine1001yahoo.com) and
    > was originaly
    > > > an exploit against WindowsNT SP4. It's goal is to "Let
    > all the users
    > > > logon into the NT machine with any password they type
    > from the local NT
    > > > machine or from other computers in the same domain." It has been
    > > > available publically for a few years.
    > > >
    > > > When running NT4ALL the user (with write access to
    > /winnt/system32) can
    > > > either put the computer, into NT4ALL's "SPECIAL" or "NORMAL" mode.
    > > > Putting a WindowsNT machine running SP6a into SPECIAL mode and
    > > > rebooting, causes the machine to not allow anyone (including
    > > > Adminisrators)
    > > > access to the computer.
    > > >
    > > > No login's are allowed because the NT system service
    > "lsass.exe" crashes
    > > > everytime the machine is rebooted and the login window pops-up.
    > > >
    > > > After attempting to repair the computer with the
    > WindowsNT cd-rom the
    > > > machine would allow logins, however the machine ran
    > EXTREMELY slow. All
    > > > available CPU ticks were being consumed by "SERVICES.EXE" and
    > > > "lsass.exe".
    > > >
    > > > NOTE: ***If testing this vulnerability it is highly
    > recommended that you
    > > > backup all your data or test on an unused machine. In
    > all my tests
    > > > after running NT4ALL the computer will be virtually
    > > > useless!***
    > > >
    > > > This vulnerability has the potential to be very harmful,
    > because NT4ALL
    > > > can run quite invisibly, and if the payload is attached to a
    > > > self-replicating email (like many macro virus's), it
    > could render a mass
    > > > of workstations useless.
    > > >
    > > > Here are links to download NT4ALL from Packet Storm
    > Security: Newer
    > > > version of NT4ALL:
    > http://packetstormsecurity.org/NT/hack/nt4all-101.zip
    > > >
    > > > Original version of NT4ALL:
    > > > http://packetstormsecurity.org/NT/hack/nt4all.zip
    > > >
    > > > (All tests were done with the original version of NT4ALL)
    > > >
    > > >
    > > >
    > > > 3. Exploit
    > > >
    > > > Run NT4ALL once (should put the machine in SPECIAL mode).
    > > > Note: You can run NT4ALL with the /t option to verify
    > that SPECIAL mode
    > > > is on. Reboot. The computer will no longer allow ANYONE (including
    > > > administrators) to log in. The problem does not seem to
    > be reversed no
    > > > matter how many reboots are attempted.
    > > >
    > > > If attempting to repair the OS with the Windows NT cdrom,
    > the computer
    > > > will allow for logins, but run VERY slow. (All CPU ticks
    > are taken by
    > > > SERVICES.EXE and lsass.exe).
    > > >
    > > >
    > > >
    > > > 4. Possible Solution
    > > >
    > > > Disable write access to the winnt/system32/ directory for
    > all users
    > > > except the Adminsitrator, until a vendor solution is provided.
    > > >
    > > >
    > > >
    > > > 5. Vendor Response
    > > >
    > > > 07-19-01: Problem sent to the Microsoft Security Response
    > Center (MSRC),
    > > > securitymicrosoft.com
    > > > They respond to the problem within a few hours.
    > > >
    > > > 07-23-01: After a few days of communication with MSRC
    > they suggest I
    > > > sent the problem to Microsoft
    > > > Product Support Services (MPSS) because it is more of a
    > > > stability issue.
    > > > I sent the issue to MPSS via the URL
    > > > http://support.microsoft.com/directory/feedback/entry.asp,
    > > > as suggested by MSRC.
    > > >
    > > > 07-30-01: After no response from MPSS I resend the
    > problem and state
    > > > that I planed to release an advisory
    > > > on the problem within the next few days.
    > > >
    > > > 08-03-01: No response has been recieved from MPSS, so
    > this advisory is
    > > > being released.
    > > >
    > > > An attempt has also been made to contact 9 about the
    > NT4ALL program,
    > > > after my original discovery, but he (she?) did not respond.
    > > >
    > > >
    > > >
    > > >
    > > > 6. Credits
    > > >
    > > > Actual credit here goes to 9, because he (she?) wrote the NT4ALL
    > > > program. All I did was be stupid enough to run it and
    > screw up one of my
    > > > systems ;-)
    > > >
    > > >
    > > >
    > > > 7. Contact
    > > >
    > > > Advisory written by hypoclear.
    > > > email : hypoclearjungle.net
    > > > home page : http://hypoclear.cjb.net
    > > >
    > > >
    > > >
    > > > 8. Disclaimer
    > > >
    > > > This advisory remains the property of hypoclear.
    > > > This advisory can be freely distributed in any form.
    > > > If this advisory is distributed it must remain in its entirety.
    > > > Hypoclear is not responsible of any use/misuse of this advisory.
    > > >
    > > > This and all of hypoclear's releases fall under his
    > disclaimer, which
    > > > can be found at: http://hypoclear.cjb.net/hypodisclaim.txt
    > > >
    > > >
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